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A SURVEY OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING IN STATE
COURTS
Wyatt Sassman"
State courts sometimes limit their power to adjudicate cases
according to constitutional standing requirements adopted by federal
courts under Article III of the United States Constitution. Why? State
courts are not governed by Article III, and as courts of general, rather than
limited, jurisdiction, play a different role than federal courts. This Article
surveys recent decisions of the fifty states and District of Columbia to
answer three questions: (1) does the state apply constitutional standing
requirements similar to the federal courts; (2) if so, what is the state's
rationale for applying constitutional standing requirements; and (3) does
the state recognize any exceptions to its constitutional standing
requirements? The Article presents its results in terms of majority and
minority positions, finding that: (1) a majority of states apply constitutional
standing, but only a minority of those states adopt the controlling federal
test articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); (2) a
majority of states that apply constitutional standing requirements attribute
those requirements to something other than a written constitution; and (3)
a majority of states recognize exceptions to their state constitutional
standing requirements. Thus, I conclude that federal constitutional
standing doctrine has had an outsized, but not controlling, influence on the
development of state constitutional standing doctrines. Lastly, I
recommend further study assessing the diversity of state rationales for
constitutional standing and generating an alternative theory of
constitutional standing distinguishable from Article III doctrine and better
suited to the states' flexible approaches.
'B.A.,J.D., Vanderbilt University. Associate Attorney, Southern Environmental Law Center,
Charleston, South Carolina. Adjunct Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law. The views
expressed in this Article are mine alone, and do not reflect the views of my current, past, or future
clients or employers. I thank the staff of KJEANRL for their helpful advice and review. All mistakes
and misunderstandings remain my own. © Wyatt G. Sassman 2015.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this Article is to provide, by short summary of each
state's relevant cases, a survey of the doctrine of constitutional standing as
applied in the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Constitutional
standing is distinguished from other types of standing, such as statutory or
taxpayer standing, by its general application as a limitation on judicial
power in all cases and causes of action. As the name suggests, this
limitation is sometimes based on constitutional text-but not always. The
doctrine is most often associated with Article III of the United States
Constitution, which the United States Supreme Court has interpreted to
limit the power of federal courts to adjudication of "cases" and
"controversies" only! The case and controversy requirement places a
burden on the plaintiff to show that she is injured in a way remediable by
the forum court.2 If she cannot, there is no case or controversy capable of
resolution-or, the case is not "justiciable"--and the judiciary's limited
power cannot extend to the plaintiffs case.' This line of reasoning has had
a significant impact on state court approaches to standing.4 The following
two oft-cited federal cases are worth highlighting for ease of reference later.
In Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, the
United States Supreme Court restated prior decisions on standing into a
two-part test applied to statutory causes of action: To have standing, a
plaintiff must show (1) "injury in fact," and (2) that the allegedly harmed
interest is within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute providing
the cause of action.5 The Data Processing decision was a product of the rise
of administrative litigation during the 1970's. As the regulatory state took
form, federal courts found it difficult to rationalize statutes that authorized
citizens to seek review of agency action in federal court with precedent,
holding that Article III required a federal court to ensure that parties had a
traditional legal interest at stake in order to hear the case.6 For example,
'See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992).
2 Id.; see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Eement of the Separation of
Po-wers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 885-86 (1983).
'Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
4 See, e.g., Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am. Inc., 737 N.W.2d
447,454 (Mich. 2007) ("Before his appointment to the United States Supreme Court, ChiefJustice
John Roberts wrote that the doctrine of standing 'implement[s] the Framers' concept of'the proper-
and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society' so that '[sitanding is thus properly
regarded as a doctrine ofjudicial self-restraint."), overruedby Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd.
of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010).
'397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
" SeeJonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Rolefora New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 101
(2003).
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what is the traditional legal interest at stake in the Administrative
Procedure Act's authorization of "affected" or "aggrieved" private
individuals to challenge government action in the form of agency
decisions?7
The Data Processing decision, if intended to clarify, was Delphic and
disruptive! What was dear was that the Court had discarded the "legal
interests test" for standing, whereby a party must assert an invasion to "a
legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege"-as "go[ing] to the merits" of the case and inconsistent with
both the requirements of Article III and "the trend ... toward enlargement
of the class of people who may protest administrative action."9 What
ultimately took the place of this test was the two-part, injury-in-fact and
zone-of-interests test, with the former element reflecting traditional
aspects of Article III standing, and the latter element reflecting the modem
reliance on statutory causes of action.1 °
In another case, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the United States
Supreme Court reformulated the Article III standing doctrine into a three-
part test: To invoke federal jurisdiction, every plaintiff must show (1)
"injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized,... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical"; (2) a "causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court"; and (3) that "it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision."" If the Data Processing decision was Delphic and
disruptive, Lujan was unmistakably clear and disruptive. Federal courts
I See 5U.S.C. §§ 501 etseq.; Standing to SeekJudicial Review ofAdministrativeAction, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 177, 180(1970) (discussing disagreement over the proper construction of the judicial review
provisions in the Administrative Procedure Act) [hereinafterJudicial Review ofAgencyAction]; see also
id. at 180-81 (discussing two opposing, prevalent views by Professors Davis and Jaffe).
'JudicialReview ofAgency Action, supra note 7, at 182-83 ("Unfortunately, the Court's test is
vague and its critical terms are left undefined .... It is even unclear whether or to what extent the
Court's test is intended to be a relaxation of the standing doctrine .... The vagueness of the Court's
test will make it difficult for the lower courts to apply.").
9 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-54;Judicial Revie-w ofAgencyAction, supra note 7, at 179.
'o Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152-53; see also, e.g., Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199,2210 (2012) (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at
153) ("This Court has long held that a person suing under the APA must satisfy not only Article III's
standing requirements, but an additional test: The interest he asserts must be 'arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute' that he says was violated.").
" 504 U.S. 555,560-61 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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now had a three-part test to apply in every case, although the test is more
easily satisfied in the types of cases that predate the administrative state."2
The Lujan Court, without yet disposing of prudential or subjective
elements of federal standing doctrine, made dear that its test was the
"irreducible constitutional minimum" required by Article III of the United
States Constitution.
13
State courts have adopted various elements of Data Processing, Lujan,
and other federal standing decisions in molding their own constitutional
standing doctrines. This trend begs the question of why state courts of
general jurisdiction adopt these federal limits when they are not subject to
Article III of the United States Constitution. This article surveys the
individual state courts' decisions for their answers to that question.
I approached this survey by researching three questions in the
following order: First, I asked whether the state applies principles of
constitutional standing, with a specific eye for whether the state court has
adopted the Lujan test. Second, I used citations from those decisions to
trace the source of their constitutional standing doctrine. Finally, I asked
whether the state recognizes any exceptions to its constitutional standing
doctrine-such as taxpayer or public importance standing-not to
determine the substance of those exceptions, but to determine whether a
state's minimum constitutional standing requirements were "reducible"
unlike the federal test.
II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
While intended to be expansive, this survey is not exhaustive.
Capturing a state's entire approach to standing is an uncertain endeavor,
since the doctrine is cross-cutting, guided by an ongoing debate in
constitutional theory, and often reliant on a court's own interpretation of
sometimes opposing and out of context decisions across more than a
century of its precedent. To allow for flexibility, this survey supports
conclusions in terms of majority and minority approaches, distilled from
the individual discussion of each state's cases below:
2 d. at 561-62; compare, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's StandingAfter Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
7njuries,'andArtielll, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 164-65 (1992) ("In 1992, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote
the dramatic opinion for the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildife, which significantly shifts
the law of standing."), witbJohn G. Roberts, Article lllLimits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J.
1219, 1219 (dismissing criticism of Lujan as "like criticizing a person for speaking awful French, only to
discover that he was in fact speaking fluent Spanish.").
13 Luan, 504 U.S. at 560. The United States Supreme Court has since criticized and modified
prudential standing elements in Lexmark Int?, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1386-88 (2014).
[Vol. 8 No. 2
2015-2016] CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING IN STATE COURTS
* An overwhelming majority of states apply some type of
constitutional standing doctrine.14
* An overwhelming majority of states provide some
exception to their constitutional standing
requirements, meaning that the requirements are not
"irreducible" as in Lujan. For example, some states
make constitutional standing requirements
discretionary, or provide explicit exceptions for cases
brought by taxpayers or in cases of public importance.
1 5
* A substantial majority of states do not attribute their
constitutional standing requirements to a provision of
their state constitution.16
About half of the states, constituting a slight minority, have explicitly
adopted Lujan-mostly in full, but some only in part-while the other half,
a slight majority, have not explicitly adopted Lujan.t¢ About half of the
states, a bare majority, have engaged in some analysis distinguishing federal
4 Arkansas and Florida apply familiar principles of standing, but with such reliance on statute or
the specific cause of action that it is difficult to label those states' doctrine as constitutional standing.
Washington is similar to Arkansas and Florida courts in closely tying standing with the specific cause of
action, but explicitly applies the Lujan test in cases brought under its state administrative procedure act.
While Oregon courts likely still apply some general standing requirements, the Oregon Supreme Court
recently issued an opinion substantially reworking its standing doctrine and leaving open whether the
Oregon Constitution mandates any cross-cutting, constitutional requirements, or what those
requirements are.
" It might be safe to say every state provides some exception to their generally applicable
standing requirements. The question is uncertain in the District of Columbia and New Hampshire. For
example, New Hampshire Supreme Court recently declared a statute authorizing general taxpayer
standing as unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with the state's standing requirements.
Nevertheless, as discussed infra, older exceptions still appear to exist in New Hampshire. Likewise, the
District's courts have recently sought to limit some existing exceptions established by prior cases.
"6 Only twelve states attribute their constitutional standing requirements o a provision of their
state constitution: Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Vermont.
"Twenty six states do not explicitly apply Lujan: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, NewJersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin. Twenty five states do explicitly apply Lujan, at least
in part: Alabama, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
"Explicitly" is an important modifier, because states that have not adopted Lujan may still apply aspects
of federal doctrine from other federal cases, or may apply requirements similar-but not identical to-
Lujan, like requiring a showing of"injury in fact" or adopting standing based on a separation of powers
rationale.
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constitutional standing doctrine from the state's standing doctrine."8
Among the minority of states that have explicitly adopted at least part of




The Alabama courts apply the Lujan test as an articulation of a long-
standing state requirement that litigants show injury, with an exception for
public interest standing. Alabama courts self-impose a limitation ofjudicial
power to "cases and controversies." No specific provision of the Alabama
Constitution limits the courts' powers to address cases and controversies,
but Article III of the Alabama Constitution does include a provision
mandating a separation of powers, explicitly prohibiting that "the
judicia[ry] shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or
either of them."2" In Ex parte Jenkins, the Alabama Supreme Court
identified, as an element of separation of powers, the idea that "the core
judicial power is the power to declare finally the rights of the parties, in a
particular case or controversy."21 The Jenkins court included explicit
citations to cases of the United States Supreme Court interpreting Article
III, linking the requirements of the Alabama Constitution with the
requirements of Article III of the United States Constitution.22 In Town of
Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, the Alabama Supreme Court
adopted the Lujan test, "effectively restat[ing]" a standard from an old
Alabama caseJones v. Black:
A party who seeks to have an act of the legislature declared
unconstitutional, must not only show that he is, or will be
"Twenty six states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, NewJersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin.
" Of the twenty six states that have explicitly adopted at least part of Lujan, twelve states have
distinguished their standing doctrine from federal standing doctrine: California, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
2 ALA. CONST. art. III, § 43.
723 So. 2d 649, 656 (Ala. 1998); see also City of Daphne v. City of Spanish Fort, 853 So. 2d
933,942-45 (Ala. 2003) (discussing separation of powers doctrine in Alabama).
'Jenkins, 723 So. 2d at 656-5 7.
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injured by it, but he must also show how and in what
respect he is or will be injured and prejudiced by it. Injury
will not be presumed; it must be shown.
23
The Lujan standard has thus trickled down as the requirement of standing
in Alabama for all cases.2' The Alabama Supreme Court has reaffirmed a
public interest exception to its constitutional standing doctrine through an
"equally entrenched" standing rule that applies in mandamus cases seeking
to compel performance of a public duty.2 ' This exception allows parties to
enter Alabama courts if they can "show that they are seeking to require a
public officer to perform a legal duty in which the public has an interest."26
2. Alaska
Alaskan courts do not consider standing a constitutional limitation on
their jurisdiction.27 In the case Wagstaffv. Superior Court, Family Division,
the Alaska Supreme Court adopted an "injury-in-fact" test.28 Rather than
jurisdiction, this test is based on the principle that state courts should not
resolve abstract questions or issue advisory opinions, and acts to both
ensure adversity and allowjudicial of self-restraint.
29
The Alaska Supreme Court has not adopted the Lujan test and,
following recent federal standing rulings, has urged that "the interest-
injury analysis . . . must have its own unique meaning in Alaska
jurisprudence if Alaska standing doctrine is to retain its quality of relative
openness."3 ° However, an unpublished opinion by the Alaska Supreme
Court applied Lujan to dismiss a plaintiffs "non-justiciable abstract and
theoretical claims." 31 Furthermore, a published decision cited Lujan's
"condemn[ation]" of a statute's authorization of claims based on
"impermissible 'abstract' procedural injury" as a constitutional boundary
away from which to interpret an Alaskan law according to the
2 904 So. 2d 1253, 1256-57 (Ala. 2004) (citingJones v. Black, 48 Ala. 540, 543 (1872)).
' See, e.g., ExparteAull, 149 So. 3d 582, 592 (Ala. 2014).
2S State ex rel. Alabama Policy Inst., No. 1140460, 2015 WL 892752, at "16-*19 (Ala. Mar. 3,
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on othergrounds by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015).
2 Id.
27 Bowers Office Prods. v. Univ. of Alaska, 755 P.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Alaska 1988).
2 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975).
29 Bowers Office Prods., 755 P.2d at 1097; see also Fannon v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 192
P.3d 982, 987 n.27 (Alaska 2008) (explicitly distinguishing Lujan).
3o See Bowers Office Prods., 755 P.2d at 1097 n.5.
3' Lamb v. Obama, No. S-15155, 2014 WL 1016308, at *1 (Alaska Mar. 12, 2014).
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constitutional avoidance canon.32
Nevertheless, Alaskan courts explicitly recognize two forms of standing
distinct from Lujan: interest-injury and citizen-taxpayer.33 Citizen-
taxpayer standing is determined case-by-case, and requires showing that a
case is of "public significance" and that the plaintiffs are "appropriate."' To
establish interest-injury standing, plaintiffs must show that they have a
"sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and an interest
which is adversely affected by the complained-of conduct."3M The degree of
the injury need not be great, as an "identifiable trifle" is enough to establish
standing "to fight out a question of principle."36
3. Arizona
In Arizona, standing is considered a prudential concern rather than a
jurisdictional one.37 To have standing, a plaintiff must allege a "distinct and
palpable injury."3' This viewpoint was adopted "as a matter of judicial
restraint" to "sharpen the legal issues presented by ensuring that true
adversaries are before the court."39 This assures that courts do not issue
mere "advisory opinions," even though the Arizona Constitution does not
contain a "case or controversy" provision similar to that of the federal
constitution.4° The Arizona Supreme Court has explicitly distinguished
Lujan from its standing jurisprudence, although the Arizona Court of
Appeals has applied Lujan and other federal cases in both published and
unpublished decisions as "instructive" or outright controlling.41 Since
standing is a prudential concern, Arizona courts may waive standing in
cases involving "issues of great public importance that are likely to recur."42
32 Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769,785 (Alaska 1999).
Ruckle v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 85 P.3d 1030, 1034 (Alaska 2004).
" Keller v. French, 205 P.3d 299,302 (Alaska 2009); Rucke, 85 P.3d at 1037.
3 Keller, 205 P.3d at 304-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 Larson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 284 P.3d 1, 12 (Alaska 2012).
37 Biggs v. Cooper ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 341 P.3d 457, 460 (Ariz. 2014).
" Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1998).
'9 Id. at 1019.
4' Id.; see also Dobson v. State ex rel., Comm'n on Appellate Court Appointments, 309 P.3d
1289,1292 (Ariz. 2013).
41 Sears, 961 P.2d at 1018 n.7; see also Freedom From Religion Found. v. Brewer, No. 1 CA-CV
12-0684,2013 WL 2644702, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 11, 2013); Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz.
v. City of Prescott, No. 1 CA-CV 09-0349,2010 WL 5019136, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2010);
Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. Kard, 199 P.3d 629,632 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Karbal v. Ariz.
Dep't of Revenue, 158 P.3d 243,247 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); McComb v. Super. Court, 943 P.2d 878,
882 (Ariz. Ct App. 1997).
42 Sears, 961 P.2d at 1019.
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4. Arkansas
Arkansas courts do not appear to have a generally applicable
constitutional standing doctrine.' Rather, the courts generally determine
standing based on the availability of a cause of action under statutes or
common law." While Arkansas courts have not addressed Lujan,4 s the
state does recognize a generalized doctrine for taxpayer standing, whereby
citizens may bring public-funds cases because they have a "vested interest
in ensuring that the tax money they have contributed to the state treasury is
lawfully spent."' The only standing requirements in public-funds cases
then, are that the plaintiff is a citizen and that he or she has contributed tax
money to the general treasury.
47
5. California
California courts distinguish that there is no "case and controversy"
requirement in the California Constitution, unlike Article III of the
United States Constitution.' Instead, standing is often determined case-
by-case with reference to substantive law controlling whether a plaintiff has
a cause of action.49 This approach, however, conflicts with recent
California decisions requiring that a plaintiff show a "beneficial interest" in
the controversy "over and above the interest held in common with the
public at large.""0 That injury must be "concrete and actual, and not
conjectural or hypothetical," and of "sufficient magnitude" to ensure
adequate presentation of the issues before the court."1 These requirements
were developed in reliance on federal jurisdictional decisions, separation of
43 Grand Valley Ridge v. Metro. Nat'l Bank, 388 S.W.3d 24,31 (Ark. 2012); Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. of Ark. v. Running M Farms, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 32,36 (Ark. 2006).
44 See Farm Bureau, 237 S.W.3d at 36-40; see also, e.g., May v. Akers-Lang, 386 S.W.3d 378,382
(Ark. 2012); see generally ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 13 ("Any citizen of any county, city or town may
institute suit, in behalf of himself and all others interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against the
enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever.").
4'Butsee Brewer v. Carter, 231 S.W.3d 707,710 (Ark 2006) (rejecting without analysis a party's
argument that standing requires, at minimum, an "'injury in fact,' fairly traceable to defendant's
conduct, which is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.").
' Chapman v. Bevilacqua, 42 S.W.3d 378,383 (Ark. 2001).
47
1d.
' Grosset v. Wenaas, 175 P.3d 1184, 1196 n.13 (Cal. 2008) (citing Gollust v. Mendell, 501 US
115,125-26 (1991)); see also Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Super. Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009).
4' Grosset, 175 P.3d at 1196 n.13; see also Jasmine Networks, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 432.
' Teal v. Super. Court, 336 P.3d 686,689 (Cal. 2014) (quoting Holmes v. Cal. Nat'l Guard, 109
Cal. Rptr. 2d 154,170 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).51
id.
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powers concerns, and the "tenet of common law jurisprudence" that "courts
will not entertain an action which is not founded on an actual
controversy."2 However, "demonstrat[ing] that the subject of a particular
challenge has the effect of infringing some constitutional or statutory right
may qualify as a legitimate claim of beneficial interest sufficient to confer
standing on that party."3 This caveat potentially folds the external standing
inquiry back into the cause of action.4
California has applied part of the Lujan test, nevertheless, where
California law has specifically limited the cause of action to those who
"ha[ve] been injured in fact under the standing requirements of the United
States Constitution.""5 Additionally, California allows public interest
standing to request a writ of mandamus or similar action. Where it is a
question of public right and the object of the mandamus is to "procure the
enforcement of a public duty," the party requesting the writ "need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient
that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in
question enforced."'5 6 Furthermore, the California Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes taxpayer standing.7
6. Colorado
Colorado imposes dated principles of federal constitutional standing
via specific provisions of the Colorado constitution. In Wimberly v.
Ettenberg, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted principles of federal
standing as articulated by the United States Supreme Court decision in
Data Processing.8 Later decisions described the Wimberly decision as a two-
part test, while also connecting those elements to specific provisions of the
Colorado Constitution.9 The first element, whether the plaintiff was
" Pac. Legal Found. v. Cal. Coastal Comnm'n, 655 P.2d 306,314 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (quoting
Cal. Water & Tel. Co. v. Cnty. of L.A., 61 Cal. Rptr. 618, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)); see also Mun.
Court v. Super. Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 182,185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
13 Holmes, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170 (citing Assoc'd Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. S.F. Airports
Co., 981 P.2d 499, 503-05 (Cal. 1999)).
54 Id.
" Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Court, 246 P.3d 877,885 (Cal. 2011). Butsee id. at 885 n.5 (citing
Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Super. Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426,432-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)).
'6 Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005, 1011 (Cal. 2011)
(internal edits omitted) (quoting Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. Cnty. of L.A., 162 P.2d 627,628-29 (Cal.
1945)).
57 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 2015).
" Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535, 538 (Colo. 1977) (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,151 (1970)).
5"HealthONE v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 892 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (quoting
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injured in fact, is considered a constitutional requirement "rooted in Article
VI, section 1 of the Colorado Constitution," under which the courts are
limited to resolving "actual controversies."' Moreover, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the injury may be either tangible or intangible,
but can neither be "indirect and incidental to the defendant's action," nor
based on a "remote possibility of a future injury."61 The second element,
that the injury be "to a legally protected right," demonstrates a concern for
judicial restraint that is similar to separation of powers concerns cited by
the Wimberly court and grounded in Article III of the Colorado
constitution.62
The Colorado Supreme Court has explicitly declined to apply Lujan.63
To satisfy the "legally-protected-interest requirement," a plaintiff may
assert "[c]laims for relief under the constitution, the common law, a
statute, or a rule or regulation."' Standing is considered a "jurisdictional
prerequisite that can be raised any time during the proceedings."5 Unless
there is a constitutional challenge, failure to show either element defeats
standing.66 Lastly, the Colorado Supreme Court has granted "broad
taxpayer standing... when a plaintiff argues that a governmental action
that harms him is unconstitutional."67
7. Connecticut
In Connecticut, standing is synonymous with "aggrievement," and
proof of aggrievement is a prerequisite to jurisdiction in state courts.68
While the courts recognize that they are "not required to apply federal
precedent in determining the issue of aggrievement,"69 important aspects of
Wimberly, 570 P.2d at 539).
Id. (citing Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317, 1323 (Colo. 1989) (en bane)).
61 Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 338 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Colo. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Compare HealthONE, 50 P.3d at 892, with Wimberly, 570 P.2d at 538; see also Hickenlooper,
338 P.3d at 1006-07 (comparing both Article VI, § I and Article III concerns to the first injury
element, but not to the second element).
63 City of Greenwood Viii. v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 n.8
(Colo. 2000) (en banc) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992)).
64 Hickenlooper, 338 P.3d at 1007 (citing Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 856 (Colo. 2004) (en
banc)).
65 Id. at 1006.
See Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461, 466 (Colo. 2015).
67Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856.
6' Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 400 A.2d 726, 731 (Conn. 1978) (citing Hughes v.
Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 242 A.2d 705, 707-08 (Conn. 1968)).
6"Mystic Marineife, 400 A.2d at 731; see also Andross v. Town of W. Hartford, 939 A.2d 1146,
1158 (Conn. 2008); City of New Haven v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 345 A.2d 563, 573 (Conn. 1974).
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
aggrievement were derived from federal decisions-particularly the leading
United States Supreme Court decisions of the 1970's, Data Processing,7 °
and Sierra Club v. Morton.7' Aggrievement is not constitutionally
grounded, but appears to be based on fundamental concepts of judicial
administration that "no person is entitled to set the machinery of the courts
into operation unless for the purpose of obtaining redress for an injury he
has suffered or to prevent an injury he may suffer, either in an individual or
representative capacity."
72
Aggrievement is split into two types: "classical aggrievement" and
"statutory aggrievement.7 1 Classical aggrievement requires a two-part
showing: a "specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the
decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the
community share," and that the aforementioned interest was "specially and
injuriously affected."74 Classical aggrievement "does not demand certainty,
only the possibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest."
7
Statutory aggrievement is defined and conferred by statute, but "the
interest that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate [must be] arguably within the
zone of interests protected by the applicable statute."76
Although Connecticut appellate courts have cited the Lujan test, they
have never fully endorsed this method, maintaining that "[t]here is little
material difference between what we have required and what the United
States Supreme Court in Lujan demanded of the plaintiff to establish
standing."77 Connecticut courts do recognize taxpayer standing where the
plaintiff can "demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct
cause[d it] to suffer some pecuniary or other great injury," which may or
may not include a municipality's misappropriation of funds.
7 8
- 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
71 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
' Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter, 35 A.2d 837,839 (Conn. 1944); see also Conn. Indep. Util.
Workers, Local 12924 v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 92 A.3d 247,253 (Conn. 2014) (quoting
Waterbury, 35 A.2d at 839).
' Fort Trumbull Conservancy, L.L.C. v. Alves, 815 A.2d 1188, 1194 (Conn. 2003).
74 id.
75id.
' Id. at 1194, 1208; see also Carraway v. Comm'r of Correction, 119 A3d 1153, 1157 (Conn.
2015) (applying the "well established two-pronged test").
'7 Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n. v. Bd. of Trs., 673 A.2d 484,491 n.10 (Conn. 1996); see
alsoAndross v. Town of W. Hartford, 939 A.2d 1146,1159-60 (Conn. 2008); Johnson v. Rel, 990
A.2d 354, 360 n.7 (Conn. Ct. App. 2010).
78 W. Farms Mall, L.L.C. v. Town of W. Hartford, 901 A.2d 649,657,662 (Conn. 2006)
(internal edits omitted).
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8. Delaware
Delaware has adopted the three-part test from Lujan "as a matter of
self-restraint."79 Delaware does not ground its constitutional standing
doctrine in the Delaware Constitution, but rather agrees with a trend of
decisions from the Supreme Courts of other northeastern states that,
"[u]nlike the federal courts, where standing may be subject to state
constitutional limits, state courts apply the concept of standing as a matter
of self-restraint to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of
parties who are 'mere intermeddlers.'"
80
Delaware courts adopted the Lujan test through a circular path. The
Delaware Supreme Court first applied the two-part standing test from
Data Processing in Gannett Co. v. State, to provide standing to "media
contests of restrictive orders where the media has alleged injury."81 Then,
the Court applied the two-part test of Data Processing again in Oceanport
Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., to interpret a statute that
provided standing to "affected persons," analogous to the statue addressed
in Data Processing.82 The Court in Oceanport Industries added that Lujan
"refined" Data Processing such that the three-part Lujan test applied to its
case.8
3
Thereafter, the Delaware Supreme Court cited Oceanport Industries as
"recogniz[ing] that the Lujan requirements for establishing standing under
Article III to bring an action in federal court are generally the same as the
standards for determining standing to bring a case or controversy within
the courts of Delaware."' However, the Lujan test, as adopted in Dover, is
not uniformly applied. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court has held
that access to a statutory or common law cause of action is sufficient to
establish standing under Dover, despite the individual elements of Lujan
85
Similarly, Delaware does recognize taxpayer standing for plaintiffs "seeking
to enjoin the misuse of public money or lands."
8 6
"Dover Historical Soc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm'n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1111 (Del. 2003).
o Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) (quoting Crescent Park
Tenants Assoc. v. Reality Equities Corp. of N.Y., 275 A.2d 433 (NJ. 1971)).
81565 A.2d 895, 897 (Del. 1989).
82636 A.2d 892, 903 (Del. 1994).
3 id.
s' Dover Historical Soc., 838 A.2d at 1111.
s5 See, e.g., In re Celera Corp. S'holder Litig., 59 A.3d 418, 430 (Del. 2012); Lf O'Neill v.
Middletown, No. CivA. 1069-N, 2006 WL 205071, at *28 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2006) (stating that Dover
applies "[fln the absence of a specific statutory grant of review").
' Reeder v. Wagner, 974 A.2d 858 (Del. 2009).
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9. District of Columbia
Despite finding that federal decisions that "arise in the context of the
case or controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution, 'are not
binding on this court,'""7 D.C. courts "have said since the creation of the
current District of Columbia court system that [they] will follow the federal
constitutional standing requirement," and thus "have followed the
constitutional minimum of standing as articulated in... Lujan."8
In the District's courts, "[s]tanding is a threshold jurisdictional
question which must be addressed prior to and independently of the merits
of a party's claims."9 Nevertheless, the District's courts appear to apply
federal precedent flexibly. For example, they make it dear that "when
Congress intends to extend standing to the full limit of Article III, the sole
requirement for standing is a minima of injury in fact," and "[o]ne
manifestation of injury in fact is the violation of legal rights created by
statute."9° Thus, D.C. courts' ability to apply constitutional-style standing
restrictions is limited to statutory causes of action.9 Likewise, the District's
courts note that "one area in which [they] have not followed strictly federal
justiciability requirements concerns the doctrine of mootness."92 The
courts do recognize some exceptions, including their finding that
"[c]onsumers of regulated products and services have standing to protect
the public interest in the proper administration of a regulatory system
enacted for their benefit," but have recently required an additional showing
of injury in these cases.93
10. Florida
Florida does not seem to apply an overarching doctrine of
7Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C. 1991) (citing Lynch v. United
States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C. 1989)).
's Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 235 n.38, 235 (D.C. 2011); UMC Dev., L.L.C. v.
District of Columbia, 120 A.3d 37,42 (D.C. 2015) (applying Grayson and Lujan).
"UMCDev., L.L.C., 120 A.3d at 42 (internal edits omitted).
90 Grayson, 15 A.3d at 234. Compare id., witb Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 598
n.4 (1992).
Compare Grayson, 15 A.3d at 234, witb Lujan, 504 U.S. at 598 n.4.
Grayson, 15 A.3d at 235 n.38.
D.C. Appleseed Ctr. for Law &Justice, Inc. v. D.C. Dep't of Ins., Sec., & Banking, 54 A.3d
1188,1200-01 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (finding that a "demonstrated interest in protecting the environment from pesticide pollution"
satisfied "the necessary stake in the outcome of a challenge to... contest the issues with the adverseness
required by Article 1II of the Constitution.")).
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constitutional standing.94 Instead, Florida equates standing with access to a
cause of action, often by statute.95 Florida courts have imposed principles
controlling "taxpayer standing" in challenges to government action.. In
School Board of Volusia County v. Clayton, the Florida Supreme Court
explained that there [are] two ways to achieve standing in taxpayer cases:
either a taxpayer must "allege a special injury distinct from other taxpayers
in the taxing district to bring suit," or make "an attack upon constitutional
grounds based directly upon the Legislature's taxing and spending
power." " This decision reaffirmed a requirement for "special injury" that
the court traced back to an old case, Rickman v. Whitehurst. 
97
11. Georgia
In Georgia, standing is a "constitutional and procedural concept" that
"falls under the broad rubric of 'jurisdiction' in the general sense," and "is a
prerequisite for the existence of subject matter jurisdiction."9 Georgia's
standing doctrine appears to have derived mostly from reference to federal
decisions.99 Georgia courts have adopted the Lujan test as an articulation of
their requirement that a plaintiff must show injury to have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of a state law."°° The Georgia Supreme
Court has referred to and applied Lujan outside of that context as well, but
has not adopted the Lujan test in all cases.1°1 For example, Georgia courts
recognize that "citizens and taxpayers may contest the expenditure of
public funds by suit for injunction."
102
94 Florida courts have not adopted the constitutional standing principles of Lujan. See Save




See id. at 336 (discussing Citizens Growth Mgmt. Coal. of W. Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of W.
Palm Beach, Inc., 450 So. 2d 204,206 (Fla. 1984) (standing to challenge zoning decisions)); NAACP,
Inc. v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 863 So. 2d 294,297 (Fla. 2003) (discussing Fla. Home Builders Ass'n v.
Dep't of Labor & Emp't Sec., 412 So. 2d 351, 352 (Fla. 1982) (standing to challenge agency action)).
9 691 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Fla. 1997).
9773 Fla. 152,74 So. 205 (Fla. 1917).
" Blackmon v. Tenet Healthsystem Spalding, Inc., 667 S.E.2d 348,350 (Ga. 2008) (quoting
Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)); see also Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 744 S.E.2d
689,692 (Ga. 2013).
" See Sherman, 744 S.E.2d at 692; see also Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n v. City of Atlanta,
638 S.E.2d 307, 318 (Ga. 2006).
" See, e.g., Atlanta Taxicab Co. Owners Ass'n, 638 S.E.2d at 318.
1"1Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc. v. City of Doraville, 773 S.E.2d 728, 734 n.9 (Ga. 2015)
('This Court has previously cited Lujan in assessing standing under Georgia law."); see also Granite
State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Roswell, 658 S.E.2d 587, 588 (Ga. 2008).
' See Brock v. Hall Cnty., 236 S.E.2d 90, 91 (Ga. 1977); see also SJN Props., L.L.C. v. Fulton
Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 770 S.E.2d 832, 838 n.7 (Ga. 2015) (although this does not include injunctions
against individual officials).
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12. Hawaii
Hawaii courts apply the Lujan test based on a belief that "judicial
power to resolve public disputes in a system of government where there is a
separation of powers should be limited to those questions capable of
judicial resolution and presented in an adversary context."1" 3 Standing,
though not described as jurisdictional, is "a threshold matter, even if it is
not raised by the parties."1'" If a party lacks standing, Hawaii courts "must
dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits of the case.""5 Hawaii
distinguishes that "the courts of Hawaii are not subject to a 'cases or
controversies' limitation like that imposed upon the federal judiciary by
Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution," and apply standing as a
"prudential rule[]' of judicial self-governance 'founded in concern about
the proper and properly limited role of courts in a democratic society. '
Similarly, standing is not tied to any provision of the Hawaii constitution,
but rather arose by reference to federal and state cases recognizing other
self-imposed justiciability doctrines.0 7
Hawaii courts apply standing rules liberally, holding that they "must
take guidance from applicable statutes or constitutional provisions
regarding the right to bring suit" but that "standing requirements should
not be barriers to justice."0 8 Hawaii courts recognize taxpayer standing to
challenge government action where the plaintiff is "a taxpayer who
contributes to the particular fund from which the illegal expenditures are
allegedly made" and "suffer[s] a pecuniary loss by the increase of the burden
103 Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292,312 (Haw. 2007) (citing Life of the Land v.
Land Use Cornm'n, 623 P.2d 431 (Haw. 1981)); see also Mottl v. Miyahira, 23 P.3d 716, 728 (Haw.
2001) (discussing standing generally); Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Haw. 1982)
(adopting what ultimately became the three-part Lujan test via Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
" McDermott v. Ige, 349 P.3d 382,390 (Haw. 2015).
105 id.
"6 Siera Club, 167 P.3d at 312 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975)).
107 Id. (citing State v. Maxwell, 617 P.2d 816, 820 (Haw. 1980) (ripeness); Wong v. Bd. of
Regents, 616 P.2d 201, 204 (Haw. 1980) (discussing mootness and prohibition of advisory opinions);
Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 564 P.2d 135, 142-43 (Haw. 1977) (asking as a "threshold question... whether or
not the doctrine of separation of powers will prevent a court from investigating possible violations of
legislative rules."); Territory v. Tam, 36 Haw. 32, 35 (1942) (discussing the political question doctrine);
see also Murphy v. McKay, 26 Haw. 171, 173 (Haw. 1921) ("The duty of this court, as of every other
judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.") (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S.
651,653 (1895)).
' Sierra Club, 167 P.3d at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of taxation."" In fraud cases, this second element is "presumed," and in
certain other circumstances, overall taxpayer standing is presumed.n
Hawaii courts have also "broadened standing in actions challenging
administrative decisions.""' Additionally, Hawaii courts specifically apply
a "less rigorous standing requirement . . . in environmental cases,"
recognizing a provision of the Hawaii Constitution providing
environmental rights.'
13. Idaho
"Idaho has adopted the constitutionally based federal justiciability
standard" and, "[wihen deciding whether a party has standing," Idaho
courts look to United States Supreme Court decisions for guidance."n
Particularly, Idaho courts have adopted the Lujan test.114 In Idaho,
"standing is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time, including on
appeal.""1 ' Standing is not based on any constitutional provision and is
imposed to "ensure[] the rational operation of the legal process;" it is the
"inherent duty of any court . .. to inquire into the underlying interest at
stake in a legal proceeding.""6 Every lawsuit must contain, as a
precondition for any party maintaining the lawsuit, "a justiciable interest
cognizable in the courts.""7 Idaho courts do allow taxpayer standing "[i]n
appropriate circumstances," including instances in which plaintiffs file suit
to enforce a specific provision of the Idaho Constitution that prohibits
certain state and municipal spending practices."' However, even in
interpreting this provision of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho courts do not
" Mottl v. Miyahira, 23 P.3d 716, 726 n.13 (Haw. 2001).
110 Id.
... Id. at 726.
112 Sierra Club, 167 P.3d at 313 (citing HAW. CONST., art. X1, § 9 (1978)).
13 Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 177 P.3d 372, 375 (2008); see also Bear Lake Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs.
of Bear Lake Sch. Dist. No. 33, 776 P.2d 452, 457 (1989) ("Although some elements of standing in the
federal system are colored by the constitutional requirements of a 'case' or'controversy,' the Supreme
Court's analyses of associational standing are instructive.").
114 See State v. Morris, 354 P.3d 187, 194 (Idaho 2015).
115 Koch, 177 P.3d at 376 (citing Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 132 P.3d 1138
(Idaho 2006)).
16 Miller v. Martin, 478 P.2d 874,876 (Idaho 1970) (citing 67 CJ.S. Parties § 6a (1950)).
117 id.
I's Koch, 177 P.3d at 376 (citing IDA. CONST., art. VIII, § 3 (2015). The court in Koch noted that
it had "never questioned the standing of a taxpayer to challenge expenditures that allegedly violate
Article VIII, § 3," which "prohibit[s] counties and other subdivisions of the State from incurring any
indebtedness or liability, other than for ordinary and necessary expenses, in excess of their income and
revenue for the year without voter approval." Id.
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stray far from federal doctrine.11 9
14. Illinois
Illinois courts apply the Lujan test.120 Illinois courts have clearly
acknowledged that they "are not... required to follow the Federal law on
issues ofjusticiability and standing," but will selectively use the decisions of
the Supreme Court as guidance.121 For example, while the Illinois Supreme
Court adopted the "injury-in-fact" requirement under Data Processing, it
explicitly rejected the "zone of interests" element of the United States
Supreme Court's decision because it felt "the zone-of-interests test would
unnecessarily confuse and complicate the law."122
In general, Illinois courts are pragmatic in their approach to standing
and their relationship to federal courts, finding that, "[tiogether with allied
doctrines like mootness, ripeness, and justiciability, the standing doctrine
is one of the devices by which courts attempt to cull their dockets."123 To
the extent that the state's standing law differs from federal law, it "tends to
vary in the direction of greater liberality" such that "[s]tate courts are
generally more willing than Federal courts to recognize standing on the
part of any plaintiff who shows that he is in fact aggrieved by an
administrative decision. 24
In Illinois, standing is not jurisdictional-it is an affirmative defense,
and the burden is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff does not have
standing to bring the alleged cause of action."2 5 As such, "a lack of standing
will be forfeited if not raised in a timely manner in the trial court."
126
Nevertheless, "[w]here a plaintiff has no standing, the proceedings must be
dismissed . . . because lack of standing negates a plaintiffs cause of
"' See id. at 376-77 ("The United States Supreme Court has held that a taxpayer has standing to
challenge a congressional appropriation that violated a specific constitutional limitation upon the
congressional taxing and spending power. There is no logical difference between making an
appropriation that is specifically prohibited by the Constitution and incurring an indebtedness or
liability that is specifically prohibited by the Constitution.").
"1 Greer v. Ill. Hous. Dev. Auth., 524 N.E.2d 561, 575 (111. 1988) ("[T]he claimed injury,
whether 'actual or threatened' must be: (1) 'distinct and palpable'; (2) 'fairly traceable' to the defendant's
actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief.")
(citing numerous Illinois and federal decisions); see also Ill. Ass'n of Realtors v. Stermer, 5 N.E.3d 267,
273-74 (1. Ct. App. 2014) (applying the three-part test).
121 See Greer, 524 N.E.2d at 574.
" Id.; see also Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (1999) ("In rejecting the zone-
of-interests test, we criticized the test for confusing the issue of standing with the merits of the suit.').
123 Greer, 524 N.E.2d at 572.
12 e Id. at 574.
"2 See Lebron v. Gottlieb Meml Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 916 (111. 2010).
126 Id.
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action." 127 Illinois courts do permit taxpayer standing based on the idea that
"[t]he illegal expenditure of general public funds may always be said to
involve a special injury to the taxpayer not suffered by the public at
large."1" However, a taxpayer plaintiff "must allege an equitable ownership
of funds" such that "when the expenditure involved is from a special fund,




In Indiana, the doctrine of "[s]tanding is a key component in
maintaining [the] state constitutional scheme of separation of powers" in
Article III, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution.13° Federal justiciability
limits do not apply in Indiana because "the Indiana Constitution has no
'case or controversy' requirement at all," but the "explicit separation of
powers clause fulfills a similar function."131 Nevertheless, Indiana courts
"do not permit overly formalistic interpretations of our separation of
powers clause to impede substantial justice."132 Thus, the Indiana Supreme
Court has defined standing in general rather than in specific terms, as
"having sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain
judicial resolution of that controversy,"' and "'focus[ing] generally upon the
question [of] whether the complaining party is the proper person to invoke
the Court's power."13 Standing remains "a restraint upon this Court's
exercise of jurisdiction.""3 The Indiana Supreme Court has not adopted
the Lujan test.13
Indiana courts do recognize a public importance exception to the
traditional requirements of standing, which encompasses the state's
approach to taxpayer standing:
Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public
rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the
usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.
'
27
Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 809 N.E.2d 1240, 1243 (111. 2004).
1" See IMI. Ass'n of Realtors v. Stermer, 5 N.E.3d 267,274 (1. Ct. App. 2014).
129id.





Old Nat'l Bancorp v. Hanover Coll., 15 N.E.3d 574,575-76 (Ind. 2014).
134id.
13' Butsee Smith v. Brendonwood Common, Inc., 949 N.E.2d 422, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(applying Lujan).
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[The Indiana Supreme] Court held in those cases that
when a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a
private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in
the matter nor be a public official."
Regardless, Indiana courts grant public standing sparingly.
137
16. Iowa
Iowa Supreme Court applies elements of the Lujan test selectively, as
part of its own, self-imposed standing doctrine.138 In Alons v. Iowa District
Courtfor Woodhury County, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that, "[a]s far as
Iowa law is concerned," standing requires "that a complaining party must
(1) have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and (2) be
injuriously affected."13 9 However, while recognizing "that the federal test
for standing is based in part upon constitutional strictures and prudential
considerations," and despite the fact that Iowa's rule on standing is "self-
imposed," the courts have noted that "federal authority [is] persuasive on
the standing issue.""4 For example, the Iowa Supreme Court has "slightly
altered the first requirement of [Iowa's] two-prong test to show a personal
or legal interest to better conform to the federal test," specifically
"align[ing] [its] test with the approach taken in Data Processing that
standing does not depend on the legal merits of a claim."'41
Likewise, the Iowa courts have applied the latter two elements of the
Lujan test, requiring "'a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of' and that the injury is 'likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, to be redressed by a favorable decision."'142 These elements
have been applied as prudential aspects of Iowa standing law, applicable to
"public interest litigation . . . when the 'asserted injury arises from
"n Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind. 1985) (discussing Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N.E. 186
(1930) and Hamilton v. State ex rel. Bates, 3 Ind. 452 (1852)).
117 Compare Higgins, 476 N.E.2d at 102 (finding plaintiffs had public standing regarding "the
right to ensure that the candidate appearing on the ballot was lawfully placed there so that votes could
be cast for a candidate eligible to take office."), with Schloss v. City of Indianapolis, 553 N.E.2d 1204,
1206 (Ind. 1990) (refusing public standing because "cable service [i]s a luxury rather than as a
necessity."). See State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 983-984 (Ind. 2003)
(discussing "various limitations" on public standing).
s Alons v. Iowa Dist. Court for Woodbury Cnty., 698 N.W.2d 858, 867-69 (Iowa 2005).
39 Id. at 863.
t40 Id. at 869.
141 Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 419-20 (Iowa 2008).
2 d. at 421 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992)).
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government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else,' as opposed to cases in which the 'plaintiff is himself an
object of the action (or foregone action) at issue.'"143
17. Kansas
Kansas courts apply constitutional standing principles under the
moniker "common-law" or "traditional" standing as part of the "case-or-
controversy requirement" under the judicial power clause of Article 3, § 1
of the Kansas Constitution."'44 "Traditional" standing in Kansas is
jurisdictional, which is similar to the federal constitutional standing
doctrine, since its requirements apply even if the plaintiff fufills the
statutory requirements to bring a cause of action.145 However, Kansas
courts have not adopted the three-part Lujan test. Rather, Kansas law
requires only that a party show a "cognizable injury" to show standing,
where a "cognizable injury" is "a personal interest in a court's decision and
that he or she personally suffers some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the challenged conduct.""4 Nevertheless, Kansas courts will look to
federal decisions in determining whether a party's alleged injury is
sufficient.147 Kansas statutes provide for taxpayer standing,148 but the
plaintiff must also show "special injury" in addition to fulfilling the
149statutory requirements.
18. Kentucky
In Kentucky, standing is not a constitutional doctrine, but appears to
143 Id.
"4 Sierra Club v. Moser, 310 P.3d 360,367 (Kan. 2013) (citing KAN. CONST., art. Il1, § 1
(2015); see State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366,382 (2008) (quoting State, ex rel. Brewster v.
Mohler, 158 P. 408 (1916), affid248 U.S. 112 (1918) (interpreting the "judicial power" text in the
Kansas Constitution as limiting Kansas courts to resolving"cases and controversies")); see also Natl Ed.
Ass'n--Topeka, Inc. v. U.S.D. 501, Shawnee Cnty., 608 P.2d 920,923 (Kan. 1980) (issuing an advisory
opinion "would go beyond the limits of determining an actual case or controversy and would violate the
doctrine of separation of powers.").
141 Moser, 310 P.3d at 367.
'46 Id. at 369.
14
7 See id. at 369-71 (applying federal principles of associational standing and citing Lujan for rule
that "Itihe injury must be particularized"); see also Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1210 (Kan. 2014)
(citing Lujan for rule that injury "cannot be a 'generalized grievance," and that "felach element [of
standing] must be proved in the same way as any other matter and with the degree of evidence required
at the successive stages of the litigation.").
1-' See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-907 (2015).
149 Crow v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Shawnee Cnty., 755 P.2d 545, 546 (Kan. 1988) (requiring
.peculiar damage" as a result of the county's actions in order to challenge expenditure of county funds).
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be a self-imposed restraint based on a prohibition against generalized
grievances as a "fundamental" principle of adjudication. Kentucky courts
have offered limited explanation of their standing doctrine."° The source
of the doctrine appears to be a 1957 case challenging an alcohol board's
decision to increase the number of licenses available."' There, the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that "[i]t is fundamental that a person may
attack a proceeding of this nature by independent suit only if he can show
that his legal rights have been violated."' This was based on the principle
that "[a] public wrong or neglect or breach of a public duty cannot be
redressed in a suit in the name of an individual whose interest in the right
asserted does not differ from that of the public generally, or who suffers
injury only in common with the general public."153
Under the modern Kentucky test, "[t]o have standing to sue, one must
have a judicially cognizable interest in the subject matter of the suit" that is
not "remote and speculative," but "a present and substantial interest in the
subject matter."1" Kentucky courts have not adopted the Lujan test, but
have adopted elements of federal decisions on associational standing,
which have seen substantially more elaboration than general standing
doctrine in the Kentucky courts.155
19. Louisiana
As is fitting for Louisiana, standing is an issue of civil procedure rather
than constitutional aw. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides
that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, an action can be brought only
5 See Interactive Gaming Council v. Commonwealth ex rel. Brown, 425 S.W.3d 107, 112 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2014) ("The purpose of requiring standing is to make sure that the party litigating the case has
a 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' such that he or she will litigate vigorously and
effectively for the personal issues.") (quoting Bailey v. Pres. Rural Roads of Madison Cnty., Inc., 394
S.W.3d 350, 362 (Ky. 2011) (Noble, J. dissenting).
"s Lexington Retail Beverage Dealers Ass'n v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 303
S.W.2d 268,269-70 (Ky. 1957).
Id. (citing Wegener v. Wehrman, 227 S.W.2d 997,998 (Ky. 1950)).
154 Bailey v. Pres. Rural Roads of Madison Cnty., Inc., 394 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Ky. 2011).
155 See id. at 356 ("[wlhile Kentucky has never officially adopted th[e] entire [federal associational
standing] test, we have held that, at a minimum, to establish associational standing at least one member
of the association must individually have standing to sue in his or her own right."); see also Interactive
Gaming, 425 S.W.3d at 112-15 (discussing federal and Kentucky associational standing doctrine).
Kentucky does recognize taxpayer standing in specific circumstances. See Price v. Commonwealth,
Transp. Cabinet, 945 S.W.2d 429,432-33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Rosenbalm v. Commercial
Bank, 838 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); see id at 431-33 (collecting cases where "Kentucky has
consistently recognized taxpayer standing").
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by a person having a real and actual interest which he asserts,""s and that a
defendant may file exception-or seek dismissal of a case-on the basis of
"no right of action," meaning the plaintiff lacks interest to institute the
suit.l" 7 The function of the first exception is to "question whether the law
extends a remedy to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition."
58
Nevertheless, Louisiana courts articulate self-imposed justiciability limits
based on the prohibition against advisory opinions.5 9 The boundary
between these justiciability requirements and the procedural requirement
to have a "real and actual interest" is fuzzy, and Louisiana courts often
overlap the two ideas.1"
Although Louisiana has not adopted Lujan, it has adopted federal
principles of associational standing.161 Louisiana courts recognize taxpayer
standing "to seek judicial review of acts of public servants that are alleged to
have been contrary to law, unconstitutional, or illegally confected" and "to
enjoin unlawful action by a public body," even where "the taxpayer's
interest may be small and insusceptible of accurate determination."162
Where a taxpayer "seeks to restrain action by a public body, he is afforded a
right of action upon a mere showing of an interest, however small and
indeterminable."1 63
20. Maine
In Maine, "standing is prudential, rather than constitutional,""
16 LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 681 (2014).
"' La. Paddlewheels v. La. Riverboat Gaming Comm'n, 646 So. 2d 885, 888 (La. 1994) (citing
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 927(5)).
15
' Id. at 887 n.3 (explaining that a defendants argument"that here is nojusticiable controversy.
is essentially directed to [plaintiffs] real and actual interest in the action," which is addressed by the
above procedural provisions).
59 In re Melancon, 935 So. 2d 661,667 (La. 2006) (quoting Romain v. Bd. of Supervisors of
Election, 21 So. 731, 732 (1897)) ("More than a century ago this court noted: 'he judiciary is silent
until the presentation of some real right in conflict opens its lips."); State v. Bd. of Supervisors, La.
State Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll., 84 So. 2d 597, 600 (1955) ("[I]t is settled that courts of Louisiana
are without power to render judgments over moot and abstract propositions and that a litigant not
asserting a substantial existing legal right is without standing in court.").
64 See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. State, Dep't of Wildlife & Fisheries, 140 So. 3d 8, 17
(La. Ct. App. 2013).
161 See Caddo Fed'n of Teachers & Support Pers. v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 41 So. 3d 1259, 1262
(La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Louisiana Hotel-Motel Ass'n, Inc. v. East Baton Rouge Parish, 385 So.2d
1193 (La. 1980), a previous case where the Louisiana Supreme Court had adopted associational
standing factors delineated in the United States Supreme Court decision); Hunt v. Wa. State Apple
Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)).
' AnimalLegalDef. Fund, 140 So. 3d at 20.
163 d.
'" Roop v. City of Belfast, 915 A.2d 966, 968 (Me. 2007).
2015-2016]
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
although "[s]tanding is a threshold issue and Maine courts are 'only open
to those who meet this basic requirement.'"6 Standing is intended "to
limit access to the courts to those best suited to assert a particular claim."1 6
There is no "set formula" in Maine for determining standing, which "has
been applied in varying contexts" and caused it to have a "plurality of
meanings." 167 A party's personal stake in the litigation is typically
demonstrated by a "particularized injury to the party's property, pecuniary,
or personal rights," which is determined on a case-by-case basis given "the
unique context of the claim.""6 Maine distinguishes its standing doctrine
from federal constitutional standing, and has not adopted the Lujan test.169
Maine courts recognize taxpayer standing in certain circumstances, which
is likewise context dependent.'70
21. Maryland
In Maryland, standing is a requirement of state common law rather
than the state constitution.17' Nevertheless, "[t]he doctrine of standing is
an element of the larger question ofjusticiability and is designed to ensure
that a party seeking relief has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome
so as to present a court with a dispute that is capable of judicial
resolution."'72 Maryland common law determines standing by asking
whether a plaintiff is "aggrieved," meaning the plaintiff "has an interest
such that he [or she] is personally and specifically affected in a way different
from the public generally," and "that the interest sought to be protected by
the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."73
Interestingly, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted the "zone of
interests" test from Data Processing, but has explicitly refused to apply
Lujan because "[t]hat test sets forth the prudential requirements for
standing in federal court, but it is not applicable to state courts."
1 74
6I Lindemann v. Comm'n on Gov'tal Ethics & Election Practices, 961 A.2d 538, 541 (Me.
2008).








Roop, 915 A.2d at 968.
170 Seegenerally Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 6-13 (Me. 1983) (addressing taxpayer
standing as an issue of first impression).
17 See Med. Waste Ass'n, Inc. v. Md. Waste Coal., Inc., 612 A.2d 241,249 (Md. 1992).
172 Kendall v. Howard Cnty., 66 A.3d 684,691 (Md. 2013).
'r' Id. at 691-92 (internal citations omitted).
171 See id. at 692; Nefedro v. Montgomery Cnty., 996 A.2d 850, 854 n.3 (Md. 2010).
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Maryland recognizes generalized "property owner" and "taxpayer"




The Massachusetts Supreme Court has noted that "[f]rom an early day
it has been an established principle in th[e] Commonwealth" of
Massachusetts "that only persons who have themselves suffered, or who are
in danger of suffering, legal harm can compel the courts to assume the
difficult and delicate duty of passing upon the validity of the acts of a
coordinate branch of the government."176 This reasoning "may indeed be
regarded as hardly more than an illustration of the general proposition that
parties to actions must be persons interested in the subject matter," which
in turn gives rise to constitutional standing doctrine in Massachusetts.
177
To have standing "in any capacity," a litigant must demonstrate that the
challenged action has caused her injury.17 But "[w]hen a statute confers
standing in relation to particular subject matter, that statute, rather than
more general ideas about standing, governs who may initiate legal action in
relation to the subject matter. "179 An "[a]lleged injury that is 'speculative,
remote, and indirect' will not suffice to confer standing," and "[t]he
complained-of injury 'must be a direct consequence of the complained of
action.'"i8 ' Standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction for
Massachusetts courts.' l However, they may nevertheless "exercise
discretion" under the principles stated in Wellesley College v. Attorney
General, to reach the merits of a case even ifit "is not properly presented for
decision."182 Likewise, Massachusetts courts recognize an exception to
standing called the "public right doctrine:"
175 State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P'ship, 92 A.3d 400,440 (Md. 2014) (quoting
Kelly v. City of Baltimore, 53 Md. 134,141 (1880)).76 Kaplan v. Bowker, 131 N.E.2d 372,374 (Mass. 1956).
177 Id. at 375.
'Slama v. Attorney Gen., 428 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Mass. 1981).
7 Centennial Healthcare Inv. Corp. v. Conmn'r of Div. of Med. Assistance, 810 N.E.2d 1231,
1236 (Mass. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Local 1445 United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Police
Chief of Natick, 563 N.E.2d 693 (Mass. Ct. App. 1990)).
" Brantley v. Hampden Div. of Probate & Family Court Dep't, 929 N.E.2d 272,280 (Mass.
2010).
in Indeck Me. Energy, L.L.C., v. Comm'r of Energy Res., 911 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Mass. 2009).
" 49 N.E. 2d 220,226 (Mass. 1943); seegeneraUlly Bd. of Health of Sturbridge v. Bd. of Health
of Southbridge, 962 N.E.2d 734, 745 (Mass. 2012) (exercising that discretion).
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[Any member of the public may seek relief in the nature of
mandamus to compel the performance of a duty required
by law. In such cases, the plaintiff acts under the public
right to have a particular duty performed that the law
requires to be performed. Where the public right doctrine
applies, the people are considered the real party in interest,
and the individual plaintiff need not show that he has any
legal interest in the result."n
23. Michigan
In 2010, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled its cases holding that
the Michigan Constitution required standing, and further, that
"Michigan's standing doctrine should be abandoned in favor of the
standing doctrine adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the
context of the federal constitution."1" In Lansing Schools Ass'n v. Lansing
Board of Education, the Michigan Supreme Court returned its standing
doctrine to a self-imposed "prudential doctrine that was intended to 'ensure
sincere and vigorous advocacy' by litigants."l"' The Michigan Court
explained:
If a party had a cause of action under law, then standing
was not an issue. But where a cause of action was not
provided at law, the Court, in its discretion, would
consider whether a litigant had standing based on a special
injury or right or substantial interest that would be
detrimentally affected in a manner different from the
citizenry at large, or because, in the context of a statutory
scheme, the Legislature had intended to confer standing
on the litigant.1"
Under the modem "approach, a litigant has standing whenever there is
a legal cause of action" and "[w]here a cause of action is not provided at
law, then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has
standing" based on "a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that
will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at
InPerella v. Mass. Tpk. Auth., 772 N.E.2d 70,73 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
14 Lansing Sch. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686,692 (Mich. 2010).
185 id.
8 Id.
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large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to
confer standing on the litigant. " 7
The Lansing Schools Court made clear that "[t]here is no support in
either the text of the Michigan Constitution or in Michigan jurisprudence.
. for recognizing standing as a constitutional requirement or for adopting
the federal standing doctrine" and "adopting standing as a constitutional
doctrine potentially may even violate the separation of powers doctrine
under the Michigan Constitution."88
In Michigan, standing overlaps with a requirement that the litigant be
a "real party in interest," which has seen some articulation in the Courts of
Appeal but has not yet been addressed by the Michigan Supreme Court
since Lansing Schools."s Likewise, the Supreme Court has not addressed
taxpayer standing in Michigan since Lansing Schools."
24. Minnesota
The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the Lujan test.91 In
Minnesota, "[sitanding is a jurisdictional doctrine, and the lack of standing
bars consideration of the claim by the court."1" Standing is assessed at
"various stages of the proceeding," and standing may be raised sua
sponte.1 93 However, Minnesota's constitutional standing doctrine is not
constitutional, and rises out of "the rule that the existence of a justiciable
controversy is essential to jurisdiction" and that "a genuine conflict in the
tangible interests of opposing litigants" is required for a justiciable
'
5 7 
Id. at 692, 699.
"RId. at 693-94 n.9; see id. at 704 (quoting Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684
N.W.2d 800, 827-28 (Mich. 2010) (Weaver, J., concurring)) ("While pretending to limit its 'judicial
power,' the majority's application of Lee's judicial standing test in this case actually expands the power
of the judiciary at the expense of the Legislature by undermining the Legislature's constitutional
authority to enact laws.").
'" See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, N.W.2d 384, 393 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013)
("[Allthough the principle of statutory standing overlaps significantly with the real-party-in-interest
rule, they are distinct concepts."); Bd. of Tr. v. City of Pontiac, _N.W.2d_, (Mich. Ct. App. 2015)
(applying both Lansing Schools and In re Beatrice).
'" But see Groves v. Dep't of Corr., 811 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) ("[M]ore
recent cases uniformly condition taxpayer standing on the plaintiff taxpayers having suffered some
harm distinct from that inflicted on the general public." (citing Lansing Sc. Ass'n, 792 N.W.2d at 686;
Waterford Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed., 296 N.W.2d 328 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980))).
191 In re Custody of D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509, 512-13 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Lujan); see also
Garcia-Mendoza v. 2003 Chevy Tahoe, 852 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Minn. 2014) (citing Lexmark Intl, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014)) (applying the three-part test).
192 in re Custody ofD. T.R., 796 N.W.2d at 512.
1
93 Garcia-Mendoza, 852 N.W.2d at 663.
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controversy.'94 Minnesota courts recognize taxpayer standing to challenge
"unlawful disbursements of public money or illegal action on the part of
public officials," like challenges to "expenditure[s] of tax monies under a
rule which the plaintiff taxpayer alleges was adopted by a state official
without compliance with the statutory rule-making procedures."19
25. Mississippi
"It is well settled that 'Mississippi's standing requirements are quite
liberal" when "compared to the standing requirements set out in Article III
of the United States Constitution," "' which the Mississippi Supreme
Court has held do not apply in Mississippi because "the Mississippi
Constitution contains no such restrictive language."" Otherwise,
however, Mississippi courts have not elaborated on the source of their
standing doctrine.'" "To have standing to sue, a party must 'assert a
colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an
adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise
authorized by law'"--specifically, "grounded in some legal right recognized
by law, whether by statute or by common law."1 An interest is deemed
colorable if it "appear[s] to be true, valid, or right," and any "adverse effect
experienced must be different from the adverse effect experienced by the
general public."" °
26. Missouri
In Missouri, standing is a prudential doctrine.°1 Missouri's standing
'" Seiz v. Citizens Pure Ice Co., 290 N.W. 802,804 (Minn. 1940); Izaak Walton League of Am.
Endowment, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Natural Res., 252 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Minn. 1977) ("The existence
of ajusticiable controversy is prerequisite to adjudication. The judicial function does not comprehend
the giving of advisory opinions. No controversy is presented, absent a genuine conflict in the tangible
interests of opposing litigants.").
195 Citizens for Rule of Law v. Senate Comm. On Rules & Admin., 770 N.W.2d 169, 175
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing "the leading taxpayer standing case" McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d
566,571 (Minn. 1977)).
1% SASS Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto Cnty., 170 So. 3d 441,445-46 (Miss. 2015).
State v. Quitman Cnty., 807 So. 2d 401,405 (Miss. 2001).
"9 See, e.g., Dye v. State ex Tel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 339 (Miss. 1987) ("There is a public need
that the legal issues tendered be authoritatively resolved. Not only do we have the authority to decide
today's questions; we have a public responsibility to do so.").
'" SASS Muni-V, 170 So.3d at 446.
' Id.; see also Canton Farm Equip., Inc. v. Richardson, 501 So. 2d 1098, 1105 (Miss. 1987)
(addressing taxpayer standing through the rubric of "adverse effect").
2' Schweich v. Nixon, 408 S.W.3d 769,774 (Mo. 2013) ("Prudential principles ofjusticiability,
to which this Court has long adhered, require that a party have standing to bring an action."). But see
[Vol. 8 No. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING IN STATE COURTS 377
doctrine arises from the joining of a self-imposed prohibition against
advisory opinions with the conclusion that "an opinion resolving an issue
which the adversaries have no standing to raise is necessarily advisory."2 2
The Missouri Supreme Court has, in a standing decision, equated Article
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution with Article V, Section
14(a) of the Missouri Constitution,2 3 and has occasionally required federal
doctrinal elements-such as requirements that a "complainant be within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question to bring an action thereunder."204 In
general, "[t]o have standing, the party seeking relief must have a legally
cognizable interest and a threatened or real injury."" 5 Although the
Missouri Supreme Court has since noted that, "[w]hen considering
standing, there is 'no litmus test for determining whether a legally
protectable interest exists.' '2° Missouri courts recognize taxpayer standing
when a plaintiff can "establish that one of three conditions exists: (1) a
direct expenditure of funds generated through taxation, (2) an increased
levy in taxes, or (3) a pecuniary loss attributable to the challenged
transaction of a municipality," adding that "[p]ublic policy demands a
system of checks and balances whereby taxpayers can hold public officials
accountable for their acts."
2 7
27. Montana
Montana courts have interpreted the language of the Montana
Constitution-specifically Article VII, Section 4 of the Montana
Constitution, which confers original jurisdiction on district courts in "all
civil matters and cases at law and in equity"-as requiring the same
standing limitations required by Article III of the United States
Constitution, but Montana has not outright adopted the Lujan test.2 The
Farmerv. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447,451 (Mo. 2002) (en bane) (describing standing as a jurisdictional
issue that "cannot be waived.").
202 State Bd. of Mediation v. Pigg, 244 S.W.2d 75, 79 (1951) ("We have no authority to give
advisory opinions on constitutional questions ... Until such persons are in court and the issues are
directly presented and necessarily involved such issues will not be decided."); see also State ex rel.
Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223,227 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
253 Harrison v. Monroe Cnty., 716 S.W.2d 263,266 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
Weber v. St. Louis Cnty., 342 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Mo. 2011) (citing Ass'n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).20 5
Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656,659 (Mo. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
Scbweicb, 408 S.W.3d at 775207Manzara, 343 S.W.3d at 659.
Plan Helena, Inc. v. Helena Regl Airport Auth. Bd., 226 P.3d 567, 569 (Mont. 2010);
Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255 P.3d 80, 91-92 (Mont. 2011) (distinguishing between federal
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equivalence of the two constitutional provisions is well established in
Montana cases, and predates many of the relevant federal cases on the
issue."° Nevertheless, "federal precedents interpreting the Article III
requirements for justiciability are [only] persuasive authority for
interpreting the justiciability requirements of Article VII, Section 4(1),"
and Montana Courts have articulated their own standing test."' "[I]n
Montana, to meet the constitutional case-or-controversy requirement, the
plaintiff must clearly allege a past, present, or threatened injury to a
property or civil right"-or, in other words, "an invasion of a legally
protected interest"-that "would be alleviated by successfully maintaining
the action."' The Montana Court has clarified that "there are in fact two
strands to standing: the case-or-controversy requirement imposed by the
Constitution" that "must always be met," and "judicially self-imposed
prudential limitations" that may be modified by the legislature.' In
Montana, standing is a jurisdictional issue that "transcends procedural
considerations," such that "courts have an independent obligation to
determine whether jurisdiction exists and, thus, whether constitutional
justiciability requirements (such as standing, ripeness, and mootness) have
been met;" "[i]f a court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, then it may
take no further action in the case other than to dismiss it."213 Montana
provides taxpayer standing by statute at the least, and maybe otherwise.
214
28. Nebraska
In Nebraska, standing is a jurisdictional doctrine drawn from the
principle that "one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action."215 Under modem
statements, "[olnly a party that has standing-a legal or equitable right,
tide, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy-may invoke the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal," and "either a party or the court can raise
standing doctrine and Montana standing doctrine).
;, See Chovanak v. Matthews, 188 P.2d 582, 584-85 (Mont. 1948) ("By'cases' and
'controversies' within the judicial power to determine, is meant real controversies and not abstract
differences of opinion or moot questions. Neither federal nor state Constitution has granted such
power." (discussing Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824)).
210 Plan Helena, 226 P.3d at 569.
211 Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 91-92.
212 
Id. at 91.
213 Plan Helena, 226 P.3d at 570.
214 See Druffel v. Bd. of Adjustment, 168 P.3d 640,642 (Mont. 2007); Stewart v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs of Big Horn Cnty., 573 P.2d 184, 186 (Mont. 1977).
211 See Davies v. De Lair, 27 N.W.2d 628, 629 (Neb. 1947) (quoting 39 Am.Jur., Parties, § 9);
Dafoe v. Dafoe, 69 N.W.2d 700,703 (Neb. 1955).
[Vol. 8 No. 2
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING IN STATE COURTS 379
a question of standing at any time during the proceeding."2 16 "The purpose
of an inquiry as to standing is to determine whether one has a legally
protectable interest or right in the controversy that would benefit by the
relief to be granted."217 Nebraska courts recognize taxpayer standing,
noting "[a] resident taxpayer, without showing any interest or injury
peculiar to itself, may bring an action to enjoin the illegal expenditure of
public funds raised for governmental purposes."218
29. Nevada
In Nevada, standing is a self-imposed judicial limitation, distinct from
the Nevada Constitution and distinguishable from the federal approach.
Nevada courts cite "a long history of requiring an actual justiciable
controversy as a predicate to judicial relief," stemming from rulings
limiting plaintiffs who can request declaratory judgments-interestingly,
amounting to a widely quoted 1986 case from the Nevada Supreme Court
that in turn quotes a treatise on DeclaratoryJudgments by Edwin Borchard
first published in 1919.219 In Stockmeier v. Nevada Dep't of Correction
Psychological Review Panel, the Nevada Supreme Court specifically
reversed a trial court's application of the Lujan standing test o a statutory
cause of action.220 In Stockmeier, the Court explained that "state courts are
not required to comply with the federal 'case or controversy' requirement";
because "[s]tanding is a self-imposed rule of restraint . . . [s]tate courts
need not become enmeshed in the federal complexities and technicalities
involving standing and are free to reject procedural frustrations in favor of
just and expeditious determination on the ultimate merits."22' "State courts
are free," the Court added, to adopt federal standing doctrine or to ignore
216 Hauxwell v. Henning, 863 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Neb. 2015).
117 Adam v. City of Hastings, 676 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Neb. 2004).
21 Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 644 N.W.2d 540,548 (Neb. 2002).
19 Doe v. Bryan, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (Nev. 1986) (quoting Kress v. Corey, 189 P.2d 352, 364
(Nev. 1948) (quoting State ex rel. La Follette v. Dammann, 264 N.W. 627,628-29 (Nev. 1936) ("The
requisite precedent facts or conditions which the courts generally hold must exist in order that
declaratory relief may be obtained may be summarized as follows: (1) there must exist a justiciable
controversy; that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an
interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy, that is to say, a legally
protectable interest; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial
determination.") (citing Declaratory Judgments, Borchard, pp. 26-57).
22o 135 P.3d 220, 225 (Nev. 2006) abrogated on otbergrounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. Las Vegas,
181 P.3d 670 (Nev. 2008).
22' Stockmeier, 135 P.3d at 225.
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it.122 The Nevada courts have "required plaintiffs to meet standing
requirements" in cases involving constitutional challenges or seeking
declaratory judgments, but "where the Legislature has provided the people
of Nevada with certain statutory rights, we have not required constitutional
standing to assert such rights [and] instead have examined the language of
the statute itself to determine whether the plaintiff had standing to sue.
"2 23
Thus, "Lujan is not applicable to a person asserting injury under" the
statute. 2
Alternatively, the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure require "[elvery
action [to] be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."2 ' A real
party in interest "is one who possesses the right to enforce the claim and has
a significant interest in the litigation. "2 The "real party in interest"
requirement "overlaps with the question of standing," and provides another
avenue for Nevada courts to require plaintiffs to show some interest in the
litigation.227 Nevada courts "have recognized [taxpayer] standing to obtain
relief on behalf of the public only in limited circumstances," generally
where the plaintiff can show individualized injury.228
30. New Hampsbire
While recognizing that "the standing requirements under Article III of
the Federal Constitution are not binding upon state courts," the New
Hampshire Supreme Court has held that, as "a practical matter, Part II,
Article 74" of the New Hampshire Constitution "imposes standing
requirements that are similar to those imposed by Article III of the Federal
Constitution."229 Thus, New Hampshire courts apply a functional
equivalent of the Lujan test because "the New Hampshire Constitution
requires parties to have personal legal or equitable rights that are adverse to
one another with regard to an actual, not hypothetical, dispute which is
capable of judicial redress."23 Notably, however, the New Hampshire
2nmid.
2 Id. at 225-26.
2Id. at 226.
2 Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc., 252 P.3d 206, 208 (Nev. 2011).
226 
Id.
" Id.; see aho Stokmeier, 135 P.3d at 225 (citing 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 36 (2002)) ("Generally,
a party must be a real party in interest to the litigation to have standing.").
2 Laborers' Intl Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 169 v. Truckee Carson lrr. Dist., No.
60528, 2014 WL 1677653, at *2 (Nev. Apr. 23, 2014).
29Duncan v. State, 102 A.3d 913,923 (N.H. 2014).
'3 Id. (citing State v. Harvey, 106 N.H. 446, 448 (N.H. 1965); State v. Kelly, 159 N.H. 390,394
(N.H. 2009); Faulkner v. City of Keene, 85 N.H. 147, 151 (N.H. 1931); State v. McPhail, 116 N.H.
440, 442 (N.H. 1976); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61(1992)).
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Constitution only authorizes the Governor and legislature to request for
advisory opinions "upon solemn occasions." The New Hampshire
Supreme Court has held that "the State Constitution, in practical effect,
limits the judicial role, consistent with a system of separated powers," based
on federal standing decisions and a 1965 decision restating Part II, Article
74 as a negative prohibition "that advisory opinions cannot be given by this
court on the petition of private individuals."3'
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has adopted other
separation of powers rationales offered by the United States Supreme
Court, citing Lujan's discussion of the "take care" clause of the United
States Constitution and holding that that "[t]he requirement of a concrete
personal injury also implicates Part II, Article 41 of the [New Hampshire]
Constitution," which commands that "[tihe governor shall be responsible
for the faithful execution of the laws." 2 Under these principles, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court declared a statute granting generalized
taxpayer standing unconstitutional.233 The unconstitutional statute was
intended to supersede an opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court
holding "that taxpayer status, without an injury or an impairment of rights,
is not sufficient to confer standing to bring a declaratory judgment.""
Presumably, that rule still stands. However, while New Hampshire's




The NewJersey Supreme Court provides a suitable introduction:
New Jersey courts always have employed "liberal rules of
standing" . . . animated by a venerated principle: "In the
overall we have given due weight to the interests of
individual justice, along with the public interest, always
'1 Harvey, 213 A.2d 428,430 (1965) (citing N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 74.); Duncan, 102 A.3d at
923 (citing Valley Forge College v. Ams. United, 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982)); see also Opinion of the
Justices (Appointment of ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court), 842 A.2d 816, 818 (2003) (discussing
constitutional imitations on the Court's ability to provide advisory opinions pursuant to pt. II, art. 74).
232 
Duncan, 102 A.3d at 924.
Z Id.
2' Id. at 920.
35 See Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. State, 111 A.3d 63, 67 (N.H. 2015) ("The court dismissed the
nine non-individual plaintiffs for lack of standing, but allowed them to proceed as intervenors. The
State does not challenge this ruling on appeal... Thus, we assume, without deciding, that the non-
individual plaintiffs have standing to be intervenors.").
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bearing in mind that throughout our law we have been
sweepingly rejecting procedural frustrations in favor of
'just and expeditious determinations on the ultimate
merits.' And that principle is premised on a core concept of
New Jersey jurisprudence, that is, that our 'rules of
procedure were not designed to create an injustice and
added complications but, on the contrary, were devised
and promulgated for the purpose of promoting reasonable
uniformity in the expeditious and even administration of
justice.'"236
Specifically, "New Jersey cases have historically taken a much more
liberal approach on the issue of standing than have the federal cases," and
distinguish that, "[u]nlike the Federal Constitution, there is no express
language in New Jersey's Constitution which confines the exercise of our
judicial power to actual cases and controversies." "37 Nevertheless, the New
Jersey courts "will not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract,"
and "[w]ithout ever becoming enmeshed in the federal complexities and
technicalities, . . . appropriately confine[] litigation to those situations
where the litigant's concern with the subject matter evidenced a sufficient
stake and real adverseness.""8 Thus, "[u]nder New Jersey's standing rules,
'entitlement to sue requires a sufficient stake and real adverseness with
respect to the subject matter of the litigation and a substantial ikelihood of
some harm visited upon the plaintiff in the event of an unfavorable decision
is needed for the purposes of standing," and "a lack of standing by a




"In New Mexico, standing . . . is not derived from the state
constitution, and is not jurisdictional," but New Mexico courts still apply
'Jen Elec. Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 964 A.2d 790, 801-02 (NJ. 2009) (quoting NJ. Builders'
Ass'n v. Bernards Twp., 530 A.2d 1254 (NJ. Super. 1986)); Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n, 275 A.2d
433 (NJ. 1971); Handleman v. Handleman, 109 A.2d 797 (N.J. 1954).
237 Crescent Park, 275 A.2d at 434,434-37.
2' Id. at 437-38; see Baxter's Ex'rs v. Baxter, 10 A. 814, 816 (NJ. Ch. 1887) ("The rule, I think,
must be regarded as fundamental, that no person can maintain an action respecting a subject-matter in
respect to which he has no interest, right, or duty, either personal or fiduciary.").
2 39Jen Ekc. 964 A.2d at 801 (citing In re Adoption of Baby T, 734 A.2d 304 (NJ. 1999) (internal
edits omitted).
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the federal Lujan test.' ° Specifically, "New Mexico state courts are not
subject to the jurisdictional limitations imposed on federal courts by Article
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution," but "New Mexico's
standing jurisprudence [has] long been guided by the traditional federal
standing analysis."2" Thus, "as a matter of judicial policy if not of
jurisdictional necessity," New Mexico "courts have generally required that a
litigant demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressability to invoke
the court's authority to decide the merits of a case."'2 Indeed, the New
Mexico Supreme Court has stalwartly defended the Lujan-style three-part
test against attack.43 Further, the issue of standing "may not be waived and
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even sua sponte by the
appellate court"-although it is unclear whether that is because "the lack of
standing is a potential jurisdictional defect" or "because 'prudential rules' of
judicial self-governance, like standing.., are always relevant concerns." '
The New Mexico Supreme Court has cited cases requiring "allegations of
direct injury to the complaining party for that party to properly seek an
injunction or challenge the constitutionality of legislative acts" as the
foundation upon which New Mexico's standing law stands.24' However, a
New Mexico court may exercise "its discretion to confer standing and reach
the merits in cases where the traditional standing requirements were not
met due to the public importance of the issues involved," under the "great
public importance doctrine."' New Mexico courts will recognize taxpayer
standing where a plaintiff can show she "will be affected by the acts sought
to be enjoined in any other manner than any other taxpayer of the state." 7
33. New York
New York courts apply a flexible version of the Data Processing test to
determine standing.24 To state the general rule, "[s]tanding is a threshold
determination" and the "[p]etitioner has the burden of establishing both an
injury-in-fact and that the asserted injury is within the zone of interests
° ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222,1226-27, 1229 (N.M. 2008).2A11d. at 1226-27.




244 Bank of N.Y. v. Romero, 320 P.3d 1, 5 (N.M. 2014) (quoting Gunaji v. Macias, 32 P.3d 1008
(N.M. 2001); New Energy Econ. v. Shoobridge, 243 P.3d 746,752 (N.M. 2010)).
24'ACLU, 188 P.3d at 1227.
246 Id. at 1226-27.
4 Eastham v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Ass'n. Bd., 553 P.2d 679,685 (N.M. 1973).
s See Soc'y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. Of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (N.Y. 1991).
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sought to be protected by the statute alleged to have been violated."249 This
rule is tempered, however, by a recognition that standing rules "should not
be heavy-handed,"25 ° such that "[a] showing of special damage or actual
injury is not always necessary to establish a party's standing," and "[iun
some instances, the party's particular relationship to the subject of the
action may give rise to a presumption of standing."25 For example, the
right of adjacent property owners to challenge a proposed radio tower
created a presumption of standing.2"2 Thus, New York courts "have been
reluctant to apply [standing] principles in an overly restrictive manner
where the result would be to completely shield a particular action from
judicial review. "253
New York courts are equivocal as to whether standing is a requirement
of the state constitution, the New York common law, or just a good idea."
"Whether derived from the Federal Constitution or the common law," the
New York Court of Appeals has explained, "the core requirement that a
court can act only when the rights of the party requesting relief are affected,
has been variously refashioned over the years" to focus on injury in fact,
which "serves to define the proper role of the judiciary, and is based on
'sound reasons, grounded not only in theory but in the judicial experience
of centuries, here and elsewhere, for believing that the hard, confining, and
yet enlarging context of a real controversy leads to sounder and more
enduring judgments.'255
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals has long articulated that
separation of powers concerns require a showing of personal injury in cases,
for example, seeking to declare a state law unconstitutional.2"6
u"Ass'n for a Better Long Island, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 11 N.E.3d
188,192 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting Soc' of Plastics Indus., 573 N.E.2d at 1038).2"Id. (quoting Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v. Bd. of Zoning and Appeals, 508 N.E.2d 130
(N.Y. 1987)).
251 Har Enter. v. Town of Brookhaven, 548 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (N.Y. 1989) (discussing Sun-
Brite).
252 See Better Long Island, 11 N.E.3d at 192; Soc'y of Plastics Indus., 573 N.E.2d at 1041 ("In land
use matter especially, we have long imposed the limitation that the plaintiff, for standing purposes,
must show that it would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the publicatlarg.").
253 
Better Long Island, 11 N.E.3dat 192.
2' See Soc' of Plastics Indus., 573 N.E.2d at 1040.2
"
5 
Id. at 1040-41 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115
(1962); see Sun-Brite, 508 N.E.2d at 133 ("[sltanding principles ... are in the end matter of policy.").
256 See, e.g., Schieffelin v. Komfort, 106 N.E. 675, 677 (N.Y. 1914) ('The rights to be affected
must be personal as distinguished from the rights in common with the great body of people.
Jurisdiction has never been directly conferred upon the courts to supervise the acts of other departments
of government. . .The assumption ofjurisdiction in any other case would be an interference by one
department of government with another department of government when each is equally independent
within the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution itself.").
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34. North Carolina
North Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly disclaimed strict reliance
on the Lujan standard as the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of
standing.2 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court explained that its cases do
not distinguish between "constitutional standing" and other forms of
standing."' Rather, "the gist of the question of standing is whether the
party seeking relief has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure concrete adverseness[,] which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends," generally
determined by reference to the individual cause of action."9 The North
Carolina Supreme Court derived this principle from early cases granting
general standing to taxpayers and cases requiring certain interests to bring
actions for declaratory judgment.' Interestingly, North Carolina is the
second state that derives a substantial portion of its standing jurisprudence
from a list in Edwin Borchard's early twentieth century treatise on
Declaratory Judgments.2 61 North Carolina maintains that "a taxpayer has
standing to bring an action against appropriate government officials for the
alleged misuse or misappropriation of public funds" where "he belongs to
the class which is prejudiced by the statute."2
35. North Dakota
North Dakota courts require a showing of standing as a constitutional
and jurisdictional requirement, but North Dakota has not adopted the
Lujan test. North Dakota's "seminal case on standing" is State v. Carpenter,
which articulated a two-part test: "[flirst, the litigant must have suffered
some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal
action," and "[slecond, the asserted harm must not be a generalized
grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens, that is, the litigant
generally must assert his or her own legal rights and interests and cannot
"7 See Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876,882 (N.C. 2006) ("While federal standing doctrine can
be instructive as to general principles... and for comparative analysis, the nuts and bolts of North
Carolina standing doctrine are not coincident with federal standing doctrine.").
2" Id. at 879.
259 Id. (internal citations omitted).
2' See id. at 879-81.
"' Id. at 881 (quoting Augur v. Augur, 573 S.E.2d 125,130 (N.C. 2002)).
262 Hart v. State, No. 372A14, 2015 WL 4488553, at "12 (N.C. July 23, 2015) (quoting Goldston,
637 S.E.2d at 881).
2015-2016]
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
rest a claim to relief on the legal rights and interests of third parties."2" The
North Dakota Supreme Court in Carpenter cited federal cases extensively
in explaining the rationale for requiring standing limits, noting that "[a]s
an aspect of justiciability, the standing requirement focuses upon whether
the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his
behalf."2 4 This made some special sense in Carpenter, which questioned
whether a criminal had standing to assert that a criminal statute violated
his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.26 He did, the Court held, in accord with a
number of decisions from the United States Supreme Court.266 The North
Dakota Supreme Court has nevertheless maintained this common root in
federal doctrine when discussing the justification for North Dakota's own
constitutional standing doctrine. 7 Although the rule is old, North Dakota
courts appear to still recognize that a "plaintiff, as a taxpayer, has a right to
bring the action in his own behalf and on behalf of all other taxpayers,"
where he "need not show any interest other than that which he has as a
taxpayer, or any damage or injury to him other than that which he will
suffer as a taxpayer in common with all other taxpayers.""
36. Ohio
In Ohio, standing is a jurisdictional limitation based on Article IV,
Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution, which provides Ohio courts with
jurisdiction "over all justiciable matters."269 The Ohio Supreme Court has
adopted the Lujan test, finding it "the irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing."270 Alternatively, Ohio courts maintain that "[i]t is an
elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative
' N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551,568 (N.D. 2001) (discussing
State v. Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d 106, 107 (N.D. 1980)).
264 Carpenter, 301 N.W.2d at 107 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
265Id.
6Id.
17 See Ackre v. Chapman & Chapman, P.C., 788 N.W.2d 344,349 (N.D. 2010) (quoting
Kjolsrud v. MKB Mgmt. Corp., 669 N.W.2d 82, 86 (N.D. 2003)) (reaffirning that "the Legislature
may not expand the scope ofajudge's duties beyond the judiciary's institutional role," and that "courts
perform judicial functions and do not render advisory opinions on abstract disagreements under our
constitutional framework for the separation ofpowers.").
2 Lang v. City of Cavalier, 228 N.W. 819, 822 (N.D. 1930); see also Danzl v. City of Bismark,
451 N.W.2d 127, 129 (N.D. 1990).
26 Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwalk, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (Ohio 2012).
Moore v. City ofMiddetown, 975 N.E.2d 977,982 (Ohio 2012).
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capacity, some real interest in the subject matter of the action."
271
More so than other states, Ohio courts have articulated a distinction
between subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action and jurisdiction
over a particular plaintiff-the former is unaffected by standing, whereas
the latter is determined by standing.272 If a court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction, any judgment rendered by that court is void; if a court
does not have jurisdiction over a particular case because of a lack of
standing, the judgment is voidable.73 Thus, for example, a defendant
whose home is foreclosed on by a bank that does not have standing to bring
a foreclosure claim cannot argue that the foreclosure decree should be set
aside for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
2 74
Ohio recognizes taxpayer standing pursuant to statute, but adds an
unexpected judicial requirement hat the plaintiff be seeking to vindicate an
interest that is not unique to the plaintiff-the opposite, of the special
injury requirement common in other states that allow taxpayer standing.
275
37. Oklahoma
Oklahoma courts have adopted the Lujan test as a perquisite to
jurisdiction. 6 Oklahoma's standing doctrine is "analogous" to federal
doctrine, and mostly indistinguishable in rationale; notably the Oklahoma
courts have not identified a constitutional source of its doctrine outside of
Article III of the United States Constitution.277 Oklahoma courts have
adopted major federal standing decisions wholesale, blending those
opinions with requirements placed by Oklahoma courts on plaintiffs
seeking declaratory judgments-like, for example, that such a request "be
predicated on interest that is direct, immediate and substantial."278
Oklahoma courts recognize, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court did "[flour
years before Statehood" when it "examined opinions in different
271 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Horn, 31 N.E.3d 637,640 (Ohio 2015) (quoting State ex rel.
Dallman v. Ct. Com. P1., 298 N.E.2d 515,517 (Ohio 1973)).2"2 Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 21 N.E.3d 1040, 1046-47 (Ohio 2014).
273 Id. at 1045.
274 Id. at 1046.
275 State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 969 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ohio
2012).
276 Bank of Am., N A v. Kabba, 276 P.3d 1006, 1008 (Okla. 2012).
27See Hendrick v. Walters, 865 P.2d 1232, 1236 n.14 (Okla. 1993).
275Democratic Party of Okla. v. Estep, 652 P.2d 271, 274 (Okla. 1982); Fent v. Contingency
Review Bd., 163 P.3d 512,519 n. 20 (Okla. 2007) ("[s]tanding refers to a person's legal right to seek
relief in a judicial forum.") (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))); Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 9 of Tulsa Cty. v. Glass 639 P.2d 1233, 1237 n.9 (Okla. 1982).
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jurisdictions" on the issue, that a "taxpayer possesses standing to seek
equitable relief when alleging that a violation of a statute will result in an
illegal expenditure of public funds or the imposition of an illegal tax."9
38. Oregon
The Oregon Supreme Court recently issued a magisterial opinion
settling contradictory elements across the state's justiciability doctrines,
including standing."0 The Court's ultimate holding is that Oregon's
Constitution does not place any limits on the Oregon courts' power "to
hear public actions or cases that involve matters of public interest that
might otherwise have been considered nonjusticiable under prior case law,"
including cases on standing.281 "Whether," the Court adds, "that analysis
means that the state constitution imposes no such justiciability limitations
on the exercise ofjudicial power in other cases, we leave for another day.
"2n2
To the extent Oregon's prior decisions on standing survive the Couey
decision, the decision endorsed the analysis in Kellas v. Dep't of Corrections,
which stated that, "[i]n sum, rejecting premature or advisory litigation is
good policy [and] it is prudent to keep judicial intervention within
statutory or established equitable and common law remedies."283 The Kellas
court's holding that "[t]he source of law that determines that question is
the statute that confers standing in the particular proceeding that the party
has initiated" is likely the best remaining guidance for Oregon litigants.2 4
39. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania courts apply federal standing doctrine and the Lujan test
unless a statute provides for standing."' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
while recognizing the Courts' otherwise reliance on federal standing
doctrine, distinguished the Pennsylvania Constitution from the United
States Constitution based on the provision that Pennsylvania's courts have
jurisdiction "as shall be provided by law."' Thus, "if a statute properly
enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature furnishes the authority for a party
"'Okla. Pub. Emp. Ass'n v. Okla. Dep't of Cent. Serv., 55 P.3d 1072, 1078 (Okla. 2002).





Kellas v. Dep't. of Corr., 145 P.3d 139, 143 (Or. 2006).
28 Id. at 142.
2' Hous. Auth. v. Pa. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 730 A.2d 935, 940 (Pa. 1999).
2
Id.
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to proceed in Pennsylvania's courts, the fact that the party lacks standing
under traditional notions of our jurisprudence will not be deemed a bar to
an exercise of this Court's jurisdiction."2" Otherwise, Pennsylvania's
reliance on federal standing doctrine is longstanding, if poorly explained."'8
Pennsylvania courts do recognize taxpayer standing as an exception to
traditional standing rules where a plaintiff can show:
(1) the governmental action would otherwise go
unchallenged; (2) those directly and immediately affected
by the complained of matter are beneficially affected and
not inclined to challenge the action; (3) judicial relief is
appropriate; (4) redress through other channels is
unavailable; and (5) no other persons are better situated
to assert the claim.8 9
40. Rhode Island
In Rhode Island, "standing is a threshold inquiry" but not necessarily
jurisdictional.2 9° "On rare occasions," Rhode Island courts "will overlook
the standing requirement by invoking the so-called 'substantial public
interest' exception in order to decide the merits of a case of substantial
public importance."2 9' In the typical case, Rhode Island courts require a
plaintiff to show injury-in-fact to demonstrate standing.292 This standard
was the result of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's "adoption of the first
of the Data Processing criteria" only, based on a recognition that "[i]t is
quite apparent . . . that there has developed a much broader concept of
standing than that which prevailed in the days when standing was
measured in terms of 'legal interests' or 'property rights,'" but also that
"[t]he Data Processing bi-partite formula is not binding on us and has been
severely criticized by those favoring the single 'injury in fact' test."293 When
adopted, the injury requirement was not grounded in any specific




• See, e.g., Win. Penn Parking Garage v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 281 (Pa. 1975)
(collecting federal decisions); Dwyer v. Dilworth, 139 A.2d 653,655 n.7 (Pa. 1958) (citing a federal case
finding no "case and controversy").
'Pittsburgh Palisades Park v. Com., 888 A.2d 655,662 (Pa. 2005).
'Narragansett Indian Tribe v. State, 81 A.3d 1106, 1110 (R.I. 2014).
"Id.
SId.
2 R.I. Ophthalmological Soc'y v. Cannon, 317 A.2d 124,128 (R.I. 1974).
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concern.294 Rather, it was a combined reaction to "a paucity of [Rhode
Island] cases dealing with the issue of standing,"29 and the influence of a
federal system "in a state of flux"2" as a result of the Administrative
Procedures Act-exemplified by Data Processing.2" After Lujan, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court later restated the "'injury in fact' requirement," in
more general terms as "'an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural'
or 'hypothetical.'"'29 Thus, Rhode Island adopted the first part of the two-
part Data Processing test, and the first two parts of the three-part Lujan
test. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has refused to recognize taxpayer
standing, partly because the state's "long-standing jurisprudence-perhaps
to a greater degree than that of some other jurisdictions-has had a
discernable focus on the requirement of concrete and particularized
harm."299
41. South Carolina
South Carolina courts have adopted the Lujan test, although
constitutional standing is not a jurisdictional prerequisite in all cases.
South Carolina courts recognize three types of standing: statutory,
constitutional and public importance standing.' "When no statute confers
standing," and the issue is not of sufficient public importance, "the
elements of constitutional standing must be met." 1 South Carolina's
constitutional standing doctrine is not a matter of state constitutional law,
but stems from the influence of federal cases and an early recognition that
it is "fundamental that one without interest in the subject matter of a law
suit has no legal standing to prosecute it."' 2 The South Carolina Supreme
Court has conflated the requirement of standing-that the plaintiff have a
"personal stake" in the suit-with the requirement that the real party in
294 Id. at 128.
2" id.
2% Id.
' Id. at 127; see Watson v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130, 136 (R.I. 2012) (discussing constitutional
limitations on issuing advisory opinions).
' Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (RI. 1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
Watson, 44 A.3d at 138.
Youngblood v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 741 S.E.2d 515,518 (S.C. 2013).
301 id.
3o2 Furman Univ. v. Livingston, 136 S.E.2d 254,256 (S.C. 1964); Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of
Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res, 550 S.E.2d 287,291 (S.C. 2001); see Carnival Corp. v.
Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood Ass'n, 753 S.E.2d 846, 850 (S.C. 2014) (citing Sea Pines Ass'n
for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res, 550 S.E.2d 287,291 (S.C. 2001)).
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interest, although the real party in interest requirement is no longer
invoked as a justification for the standing doctrine as it is in some other
states.3 When a plaintiff must show constitutional standing, the Lujan
test applies.3' Public importance standing is available where there is a need
for "future guidance," meaning that the case addresses "an issue which
transcends a purely private matter and rises to the level of public
importance."305
42. South Dakota
South Dakota courts have adopted the Lujan test in full. The South
Dakota Supreme Court has explained:
The term 'standing' or 'standing to sue' has been variously
applied in diverse situations and appears to have different
limitations and exceptions peculiar to the situation where it
is applied. For instance, in federal courts under the
requirements of Article III of the United States
Constitution, plaintiff must show 'standing.3°
In contrast,"[s]tanding is established through being a 'real party in
interest' and it is statutorily controlled by SDCL 15-6-17(a)-which
begins: "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest."
When combined with a broad statement that, "[g]enerally, for a
litigant to have standing to bring an action before the court, the litigant
must 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,"'the
restatement became: "The real party in interest requirement for standing is
satisfied if the litigant can show 'that he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
Defendant.'30 7 This restatement was in turn equated with the three-part
' Compare Townsend v. Townsend, 474 S.E.2d 424,427 (S.C. 1996) ("To have standing, one
must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit; i.e., one must be the "real party in
interest."), witb Bailey v. Bailey, 441 S.E.2d 325,327 (S.C. 1994) ("To have standing, a party must have
a personal stake in the subject matter of a lawsuit. In South Carolina, a party must also be the 'real party
in interest.").
304 Carnival Corp., 753 S.E.2d at 850.
3o' ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 669 S.E.2d 337,341 (S.C. 2008).
Wang v. Wang, 393 N.W.2d 771, 775 (S.D. 1986).
37 Bd. of Educ. of Agar v. McGee, 527 N.W.2d 282,284 (S.D. 1995) (citing Wang v. Wang.,
393 N.W.3d 771, 775 (S.D. 1986)).
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Lujan test.3°8
43. Tennessee
Tennessee courts recognize "two categories of standing:" "non-
constitutional standing and constitutional standing."3" "To establish
constitutional standing, a plaintiff must satisfy 'three indispensable
elements' of the Lujan test."3" ° In Tennessee, constitutional standing is not
required by the Tennessee Constitution. Rather, constitutional standing is
"a judge-made doctrine which has no per se recognition in the rules,"
(meaning the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure) and is largely founded
on early reference to federal cases.3" In contrast, "[n]on-constitutional
standing focuses on considerations of judicial restraint, such as whether a
complaint raises generalized questions more properly addressed by another
branch of the government, and questions of statutory interpretation, such
as whether a statute designates who may bring a cause of action or creates a
limited zone of interests."31 2 Tennessee courts will "typically confer
standing when a taxpayer (1) alleges a 'specific illegality in the expenditure
of public funds' and (2) has made a prior demand on the governmental
entity asking it to correct the alleged illegality."313
44. Texas
Texas courts hold that "standing is a constitutional prerequisite to
maintaining a suit" mandated by two provisions of the Texas Constitution,
and apply the Lujan test to establish standing.314 The first constitutional
source is Article II, Section 1, which codifies the separation of powers
between the three branches of Texas government. This constitutional
provision has been interpreted as prohibiting advisory opinions, as well as
abstract questions of law that are not binding on the parties, and thus
require "remedying an actual or imminent harm."31 "Texas courts, like
30 Benson v. S.D., 710 N.W.2d 131, 141 (S.D. 2006).
City of Memphis v. Harget, 414 S.W.3d 88,98 (Tenn. 2013).
310 id.
311 Fannon v. City of LaFollette, 329 S.W.3d 418, 424 (Tenn. 2010);
Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806,808 (Tenn. 1976).
312 
Hargett, 414 S.W.3d at 98.
31- Fannon, 329 S.W.3d at 427.
314 Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,444 (Tex. 1993);
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299,304 (Tex. 2008).31
1 Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (U.S. 1984).
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federal courts, have no jurisdiction to render such opinions."316 The second
constitutional source is Article I, Section 13, which opens Texas courts to
"every person for an injury done to him," which Texas courts have
interpreted to require the same injury showing as under Article III of the
United States Constitution.317 "The existence of standing-or the lack
thereof-is a rigid question of law that is not negotiable and cannot be
waived."31  However, "[tiaxpayers in Texas have standing to enjoin the
illegal expenditure of public funds, and need not demonstrate a
particularized injury." 319 "Implicit in this rule are two requirements: (1) that




In Utah, standing is a jurisdictional requirement required by the Utah
Constitution because standing requirements "emanate from the principle
of separation of powers."321 Utah courts note that the requirements of the
Utah Constitution are distinguishable from the requirements of Article III
of the United States Constitution, explaining that "the requirement that
the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal dispute is
rooted in the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary in Utah."322
"Under the traditional test for standing," in Utah, "the interests of the
parties must be adverse and the parties seeking relief must have a legally
protectable interest in the controversy, and a "legally protectable" interest
may arise "under either statute or the common law."323 Nevertheless, a
Utah "[c]ourt may grant standing where matters of great public interest
and societal impact are concerned," even if the plaintiff does satisfy the
typical standing requirements.3 24
316 id.
317 
Id. But see id. at 475 (Dogget, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[c]laiming "guidance" from
federal precedent... the majority overrules all Texas cases treating standing as a procedural [meaning
waiveablel issue, then unnecessarily modifies all Texas precedent addressing the merits of standing.
Without explanation, today's opinion simply photocopies into our Texas law books the federal law of
standing with all of its much-criticized complexities. Once again the majority chooses more
Washington wisdom for Texas when what we need is more Texas thinking in Washington.").
3" State v. Naylor, No. 11-0114, 2015 WL 3852284, at *5 (Tex. June 19,2015).
31 9Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 2001).
320 id.
3' Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of Dep't of Natural Res., 228 P.3d 747, 751 (Utah 2010).
322
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).
31 Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 811 (Utah 2007) (internal citations omitted).
" Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1103 (Utah 2013); see also Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442,
443 (Utah 1978) ('[alppellants cite the usual rule that one must be personally adversely affected before
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46. Vermont
Vermont applies the Lujan test as a self-imposed jurisdictional limit
based on separation of powers concerns.3 25 The Vermont Supreme Court
adopted federal standing doctrine in toto in a 1949 decision, based on the
separation of powers provision in Chapter I, Section 5 of the Vermont
Constitution.326 "To have a case or controversy subject to the jurisdiction of
the court, the plaintiffs must have standing. In the absence of standing, any
judicial decision would be merely advisory, and Vermont courts are without
constitutional authority to issue advisory opinions."327 Thus, Vermont has
adopted the Lujan test to determine standing.32 However, "[i]n Vermont,
taxpayer's suits have long been recognized as appropriate vehicles for
seeking relief from official action."329
47. Virginia
In Virginia, standing is a self-imposed prudential limitation:
The point of standing is to ensure that the person who
asserts a position has a substantial egal right to do so and
that his rights will be affected by the disposition of the
case. In asking whether a person has standing, we ask, in
essence, whether he has a sufficient interest in the subject
matter of the case so that the parties will be actual
adversaries and the issues will be fully and faithfully
developed.33
The controlling test is that a plaintiff "must demonstrate a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy."331  The requirement is not
he has standing to prosecute an action. While such is true, it is also true this Court may grant standing
where matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned.").
325 Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 693 A.2d 1045, 1047 (Vt. 1997).
328In re Constitutionality of House Bill 88, 64 A.2d 169, 172 (Vt. 1949) ("[t]he judicial power, as
conferred by the Constitution of this State upon this Court, is the same as that given to the Federal
Supreme Court by the United States Constitution.").327 Brod v. Agency of Natural Res., 936 A.2d 1286, 1289 (Vt. 2007).
325 See Parker v. Town of Milton, 726 A.2d 477,480 (Vt. 1998) (citing Hinesburg, 693 A.2d at
1048); see also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 1091 (2011).
9 Cent. Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Town of Springfield, 379 A.2d 677,679 (Vt. 1977).
3. Cupp v. Bd. of Supr's of Fairfax Cnty., 318 S.E.2d 407,411 (Va. 1984) (citing 2 C. Antieau,
Modem Constitutional Law § 15:23 (1969)).
"'Moreau v. Fuller, 661 S.E.2d 841, 845 (Va. 2008).
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constitutional, but stems from decisions regarding declaratory judgments
and early citations to treatises.332 Although the Virginia Supreme Court
has not adopted the Lujan test, some statutes explicitly require plaintiffs to
show the three parts of Lujan to seek judicial review of government actions.
In these cases, the Virginia courts have applied Lujan and other federal
precedents.333 Virginia courts do recognize taxpayer standing to challenge
"actions taken by a local government," but not "against the
Commonwealth unless he can demonstrate a direct interest, pecuniary or
otherwise, in the outcome of the controversy that is separate and distinct
from the interest of the public at large" or a statutory right to bring that
action. 334
48. Washington
In Washington, standing outside of administrative law cases is
generally addressed with reference to a particular cause of action, and thus
standing does not appear to be a constitutional or jurisdictional limitation.
For example, in the wake of Data Processing, the Washington Supreme
Court adopted the "zone of interest" element of the federal decision-and
not, it seems, the injury in fact requirement-as a restatement of a "more
liberalized view of standing now recognized both by the United States
Supreme Court and our own."33 In that case, the Washington Supreme
Court thus found a "justiciable controversy" in a school district's "challenge
[to] the constitutionality of the school financing system" because the
district "stands at the very vortex of the entire financing system."336
Likewise, Washington courts may overlook any problems of standing
"[w]here a controversy is of serious public importance and immediately
affects substantial segments of the population and its outcome will have a
direct bearing on the commerce, finance, labor, industry or agriculture
generally."337 In such cases, "questions of standing to maintain an action
3 See, e.g., Lynchburg Traffic Bureau v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 147 S.E.2d 744, 745 (Va. 1966)
("it is well settled that 'in order to entitle any person to maintain an action in court it must be shown
that he has ajusticiable interest in the subject matter in litigation; either in his own right or in a
representative capacity.').
... Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 643 S.E.2d 219,225 (Va. 2007); see
also Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Com. ex rel. Virginia State Water Control Bd., 695 S.E.2d 549,
552 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
3
3Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 S.E.2d 67,72 (Va. 2001).
3 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 82 (Wash. 1978).
336 Id.
117 Wash. Nat. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 459 P.2d 633,635 (1969).
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should be given less rigid and more liberal" application.338 However,
Washington Courts have applied Lujan and other federal principles to
interpret their state administrative procedure act's cause of action for
"affected persons"-a standard that the Washington Supreme Court has
explained "is drawn from and explained by federal case law."339 This
interpretation has been applied to other Washington statutes providing a
cause of action to "aggrieved" persons, ultimately yielding a combined
requirement that plaintiffs seeking judicial review of agency action show
injury in fact per Lujan and the zone of interests test per Data Processing.m4
This administrative standing test is distinguishable from "the general
standing test applicable in other contexts," but whether that general test is
outside of a statutorily defined cause of action is unclear in recent cases.341
49. West Virginia
In West Virginia, "[s]tanding is a jurisdictional requirement that
cannot be waived, and may be brought up at any time in a proceeding."342
West Virginia courts have adopted the Lujan test.3 3 The rationale for the
state's standing doctrine is not constitutional; the rationale is built in
reference to federal cases and West Virginia cases on declaratory
judgments.' In contrast with some states, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals read Data Processing as abandoning, rather than
articulating, new standing requirements, and thus articulated a foundation
under the West Virginia Constitution for the right of"[t]he natural citizen
in our system of government.., to expect that his elected officials, agents
and appointees shall comply with the law."3 5 Nevertheless, the Court
required such a person to illustrate that "significant interests are directly
injured or adversely affected by governmental action,"' which has in turn
evolved into requiring the Lujan test.
338 Id.
339Allan v. Univ. of Wash., 997 P.2d 360,362 (Wash. 2000).
3oSee KS Tacoma Holdings, LLC v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 272 P.3d 876,881 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2012).
" City of Burlington v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 351 P.3d 875, 879 (Wash. Ct. App.
2015).
342 Men & Women Against Discrimination v. Family Prot. Servs. Bd., 725 S.E.2d 756, 761 (W.
Va. 2011).
3" See Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 576 S.E.2d 807,821 (W. Va. 2002).
Id.; see Mainella v. Bd. of Trs. of Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund of City of Fairmont, 27
S.E.2d 486, 487-88 (W. Va. 1943) ("Is there an actual controversy? Courts are not constituted for the
purpose of making advisory decrees or resolving academic disputes.").
3" Shobe v. Latimer, 253 S.E.2d 54, 60-61 (W. Va. 1979).3
6Id.
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50. Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, standing is a self-imposed prudential doctrine. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive review of its
standing doctrine in 2011 and offered three findings:
* Standing in Wisconsin is not to be construed narrowly
or restrictively, but rather should be construed
liberally.
* No single longstanding or uniform test for standing
appears in the case law
* The basic thrust of all the cases.., is that standing
depends on (1) whether the party whose standing is
challenged has a personal interest in the controversy
(sometimes referred to in the case law as a 'personal
stake' in the controversy); (2) whether the interest of
the party whose standing is challenged will be injured,
that is, adversely affected; and (3) whether judicial
policy calls for protecting the interest of the party
whose standing is challenged.7
Standing in Wisconsin is neither constitutional nor jurisdictional but is
rather "a matter of judicial policy" distinguishable from federal
constitutional doctrine and determined by a broad reaching analysis
"examining the interests involved, applicable statutes, constitutional
provisions, rules, and relevant common law principles."348 Likewise, in
Wisconsin "a taxpayer has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute when any illegal expenditure of public funds directly affects
taxpayers and causes them to sustain a pecuniary loss" and "[t]he fact that
the ultimate pecuniary loss to the individual taxpayer may be almost
infinitesimal is not controffing."
349
7 Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 797 N.W.2d 789, 798-99 (Wis.
2011).
ld. at 798 n.18, 804; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Alexander, 838 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. Ct. App.
2013).
,9 Coyne v. Walker, 862 N.W.2d 606,610 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting City of Appleton v.
Town ofMenasha, 419 N.W.2d 249 (1988)).
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51. Wyoming
In Wyoming, standing is a prudential doctrine but "of jurisdictional
magnitude."3 0 Standing requires a plaintiff to have a "personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy," where a "personal stake" is a "tangible interest
at stake."3"' Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the Lujan test to
determine that "personal stake."3" 2  Wyoming's standing is not
constitutional and is "a necessary and useful tool to be used by courts in
ferreting out those cases which ask the courts to render advisory opinions
or decide an artificial or academic controversy without there being a
palpable injury to be remedied."3 3 Soon after Data Processing, Wisconsin
courts held that its standing rules are "conceptually similar to the analysis
required by the federal rule" such that federal decisions were appropriate
authorities to consider in administrative law cases, ultimately yielding
functionally similar doctrines across various cases.
CONCLUSION
In sum, federal constitutional standing doctrine has had a more
pervasive influence than one would suspect, but not a controlling influence
on the development of constitutional standing doctrine in the states. Most
states distinguish between the structure of the state and federal courts, and
avoid adopting federal doctrine without regard to their own precedent or
circumstances. Nevertheless, development of constitutional standing
requirements in federal courts undoubtedly prompted state courts to take
up the issue and develop approaches following the path blazed by federal
decisions. For purposes of the type of constitutional standing articulated in
Lujan, the federal courts were the first mover in all but a very small
minority of states.35 5
These findings suggest further study into the diversity of the various
31 State ex rel Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048, 1051 (Wyo. 1995).
351 Id.
312 Millerv. Wyo. Dep't of Health, 275 P.3d 1257,1261 (Wyo. 2012).
313 Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310,317 (Wyo. 1980).3"4 Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 230 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Wyo.
1975); Bayou Liquors, Inc., 906 P.2d at 1049 ("[wle conclude, however, that the better result is to apply
Walker's standing requirements to both APA and non-APA reviews of cases involving the issuance or
renewal of retail liquor licenses. Our decision is based upon considerations of uniformity."); Miller, 275
P.3d at 1261.
... I do not mean that states did not have early cases dealing with standing as an issue of
justiciability, or even as an element of separation of powers. Many states did. But as for articulating a
generally applicable constitutional standing test as opposed to a more prudential, discretionary
approach, federal courts led the states.
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states' rationales for constitutional standing requirements. State
constitutions are often more similar to each other than any one state
constitution is to the United States Constitution, yet most states'
constitutional standing doctrines share more similarities with federal
doctrine than they share with each other's. This diversity is exemplified in
the varied non-text based state rationales for constitutional standing, often
relaying statements of fundamental principles in early 19th or 20th century
treatises and cases about advisory opinions, declaratory judgments, and
requests for writs of mandamus. Searching for the common thread among
state court approaches could help develop a theory of standing better fitted
to the states-tailored to the "reducibility" of state constitutional standing
though commonly shared exceptions, and more in line with the flexibility
of other justiciability doctrines.
